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THE CASE AGAINST PROSECUTING REFUGEES 
Evan J. Criddle 
ABSTRACT—Within the past several years, the U.S. Department of Justice 
has pledged to prosecute asylum-seekers who enter the United States outside 
an official port of entry without inspection. This practice has contributed to 
mass incarceration and family separation at the U.S.–Mexico border, and it 
has prevented bona fide refugees from accessing relief in immigration court. 
Yet, federal judges have taken refugee prosecution in stride, assuming that 
refugees, like other foreign migrants, are subject to the full force of American 
criminal justice if they skirt domestic border controls. This assumption is 
gravely mistaken. 
This Article shows that Congress has not authorized courts to punish 
refugees for illegal entry or reentry. While largely taken for granted today, 
the idea that refugees may be prosecuted for such acts is in tension with the 
full text, context, and purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It is 
also inconsistent with traditional canons of statutory interpretation, such as 
the Charming Betsy canon, the canon on constitutional avoidance, and the 
rule of lenity. Therefore, federal prosecutors should abandon refugee 
prosecution, and federal courts should hold that the criminal prohibitions on 
illegal entry and reentry do not apply to refugees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2017, a Kafkaesque scene unfolded at the federal 
courthouse in El Paso, Texas. Three women from El Salvador who had 
traveled over two thousand miles in search of asylum found themselves 
facing criminal illegal entry charges in an American courtroom.1 With tears 
in their eyes, they begged their public defender to contest the charges on the 
ground that they were asylum-seekers2 fleeing persecution, only to be told 
that the exercise would be futile and counterproductive. The fact that they 
might be legally entitled to enter and live in the United States as refugees did 
not necessarily preclude their prosecution for illegal entry. Moreover, 
fighting the charges would likely only increase the amount of time they 
would spend in jail, their attorney explained. Visibly bewildered, but relying 
on the advice of counsel, all three pleaded guilty. The presiding magistrate 
 
 1 See HUM. RTS. FIRST, PUNISHING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S 
MISUSE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 9 (2018) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST], 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/2018-Report-Punishing-Refugees-Migrants.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P2WG-SV69] (recounting court observation of Magistrate Judge Leon Schydlower, 
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso, Texas, September 7, 2017). For economy’s 
sake, I have omitted one defendant, a male asylum-seeker from Nicaragua, from this anecdote. 
 2 An “asylum-seeker” is a foreign national at or within the United States’ borders who seeks legal 
recognition as a refugee. 
115:717 (2020) The Case Against Prosecuting Refugees 
719 
judge expressed sympathy for their position, lamenting, “[N]one of you are 
criminals.”3 Then, he proceeded to convict and sentence all three women.4 
Sadly, this episode is no aberration. Within the past several years, both 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) have declared that asylum-seekers will receive “zero 
tolerance” if they enter the United States without inspection.5 This policy has 
led to the systematic prosecution of asylum-seekers at courthouses along the 
U.S.–Mexico border.6 Prosecutors have charged asylum-seekers with illegal 
entry7 and reentry,8 even in cases where the defendants, as bona fide refugees, 
were legally entitled to receive safe haven in the United States.9 
To be sure, not every migrant who enters the United States without 
inspection qualifies as a refugee. Most migrants who cross the U.S.–Mexico 
border outside a port of entry never request asylum.10 Among the subset of 
irregular migrants11 who do seek asylum, many are not legally entitled to 
protection in the United States as bona fide refugees. To qualify as 
 
 3 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 9. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal 
Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Zero-Tolerance], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-
general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/R8GE-UT49]. 
 6 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 9–16 (documenting cases). 
 7 See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (imposing criminal sanctions against “[a]ny alien who . . . enters or attempts 
to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers,” “eludes 
examination or inspection by immigration officers,” and “attempts to enter or obtains entry to the United 
States by a willfully false or misleading misrepresentation or the willful concealment of a material fact”). 
 8 See id. § 1326 (prohibiting “any alien” from “enter[ing], attempt[ing] to enter, or [being] at any 
time found in, the United States” if an alien “has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed 
or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding . . . 
unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain [the Attorney General’s] advance 
consent [to reapply for admission]”); Immigration Prosecutions for June 2019, TRAC REPS. (Aug. 9, 
2019) [hereinafter TRAC], https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/ 
immigration/monthlyjun19/fil/ [https://perma.cc/3U23-UA6B] (observing that illegal entry and reentry 
make up the vast majority of immigration prosecutions). 
 9 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (providing that refugees qualify for withholding of removal 
irrespective of their immigration status and regardless of whether they are at a designated port of arrival). 
 10 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STATS., EFFORTS BY DHS TO ESTIMATE 
SOUTHWEST BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY 16–17 (2017) [hereinafter DHS STATISTICS] 
(observing that roughly one-third of arriving migrants are “minors, family units, Cubans, and individuals 
who request asylum”). 
 11 Throughout this Article, I employ the terms “irregular entry” and “irregular migrants” to capture 
the phenomenon of foreign nationals entering the United States without inspection outside an official port 
of entry. I use this neutral terminology, rather than “illegal entry” and “illegal entrants,” to avoid 
prejudging whether particular migrants have entered the United States illegally. The thesis of this Article, 
after all, is that U.S. law does not prohibit bona fide refugees from entering the United States without 
inspection outside an official port of entry. 
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“refugees” under domestic and international law, asylum-seekers must 
demonstrate that they have a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” in their 
country of origin based on their “race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”12 Most asylum-seekers do not 
satisfy these criteria.13 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that refugee prosecution is a rare 
phenomenon in the United States. The federal government prosecutes tens 
of thousands of migrants for illegal entry and reentry every year—including 
over 100,000 in the 2019 fiscal year alone.14 If a third of these irregular 
migrants are asylum-seekers, and if 20% of those asylum-seekers are bona 
fide refugees, as then-Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen 
estimated in May 2018,15 it would still follow that thousands of refugees have 
served time for illegal entry or reentry within the past several years. 
Prosecuting refugees in this manner violates the United States’ 
obligations under international law. Article 31 of the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) 
declares that governments 
 
 12 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) 
(defining a “refugee” principally as a “person who . . . is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable 
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion”). International policymakers sometimes reserve the term “refugee” for 
migrants who have already had their legally protected status confirmed by domestic authorities or an 
international organization. See Asylum-Seekers, UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/asylum-seekers.html [https://perma.cc/H7QL-MQG4]. For purposes of this 
Article, however, I follow the usage of the INA and the Refugee Convention, which define “refugee” 
objectively without regard to whether authorities have recognized this status. See UNHCR, A GUIDE TO 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION AND BUILDING STATE ASYLUM SYSTEMS 18 (2017), 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d4aba564/refugee-protection-guide-international-
refugee-law-handbook-parliamentarians.html [https://perma.cc/JKL9-AKAP] (“A person is a refugee as 
soon as the criteria contained in this [legal] definition are fulfilled. In other words, a person does not 
become a refugee because of a positive decision on an application for protection. Recognition of refugee 
status is declaratory: it confirms that the person is indeed a refugee.”). 
 13 See Anna Giaritelli, 80 Percent of Asylum Cases at Southwest Border Aren’t Legitimate, DHS 
Chief Says, WASH. EXAM’R (May 16, 2018, 10:28 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tag/fox-
news?source=%2Fnews%2F80-percent-of-asylum-cases-at-southwest-border-arent-legitimate-dhs-
chief-says [https://perma.cc/48G8-ZYUG]. 
 14 In fiscal year 2019, federal prosecutors charged 80,866 defendants with illegal entry and 25,426 
defendants with illegal reentry. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Department of Justice Prosecuted a Record-
Breaking Number of Immigration-Related Cases in Fiscal Year 2019 (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-prosecuted-record-breaking-number-immigration-
related-cases-fiscal-year [https://perma.cc/N9V9-NWAN]. 
 15 Giaritelli, supra note 13. 
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shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on 
refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was 
threatened . . . , enter or are present in their territory without authorization, 
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show 
good cause for their illegal entry or presence.16 
Although the United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention, it 
agreed to be bound by Article 31 when it acceded to the United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol).17 Thus, by 
prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry, the United States has 
exposed itself to international censure. 
Conventional wisdom suggests, however, that the Refugee Convention 
and Protocol do not pose an obstacle to refugee prosecution in domestic 
courts. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)18 does not expressly 
grant refugees immunity from criminal liability for entering U.S. territory 
without inspection. And because federal courts have determined that the 
Refugee Protocol is a non-self-executing treaty,19 they have concluded that 
refugees cannot rely on Article 31 as a defense to prosecution.20 Prosecutors 
therefore assume that refugees who enter the United States outside an official 
port of entry are subject to the full force of American criminal justice.21 
Judges, in turn, routinely convict and sentence refugees for immigration 
crimes, even as they occasionally express moral qualms about the practice.22 
 
 16 Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 31(1). 
 17 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
606 U.N.T.S. 268 (1968) [hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. States–parties to the Refugee Protocol 
“undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to refugees.” Id. art. I(1). A key difference 
between the two treaties is that the Refugee Protocol eliminates certain temporal and geographic 
restrictions in the Refugee Convention’s “refugee” definition. Id. art. I(2). 
 18 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 229. 
 19 See, e.g., Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 
407, 428–29 n.22 (1984)). A non-self-executing treaty does not generate judicially enforceable legal 
claims or defenses. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05, 505 n.2 (2008). 
 20 See, e.g., United States v. Malenge, 294 F. App’x 642, 644 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting the argument 
that prosecution for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1543, 1544, and 1546 violated the Refugee Protocol 
because the Protocol “is not a self-executing treaty” and therefore does “not provide [a refugee] with any 
judicially enforceable rights”); United States v. Velasquez-Luna, No. 18-mj-11463-WQH, 2019 WL 
338947, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) (“The Protocol does not confer judicially enforceable rights that 
preclude . . . prosecution under [§ 1325(a)] for eluding inspection and examination.”). 
 21 See Natasha Arnpriester, Trumping Asylum: Criminal Prosecutions for “Illegal” Entry and 
Reentry Violate the Rights of Asylum-Seekers, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 3, 16 (2017). 
 22 See Malenge, 294 F. App’x at 644–45 (characterizing refugee prosecution as “troubling” and 
urging that “[t]here is surely a more appropriate way to handle such cases, and to deter such conduct, 
short of criminal prosecution”). 
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This Article challenges the prevailing assumption that U.S. law permits 
the federal government to prosecute refugees. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the INA’s provisions establishing criminal penalties for illegal 
entry and reentry do not apply to refugees. The idea that refugees may be 
held criminally liable for such acts, while largely taken for granted today, is 
inconsistent with Congress’s statutory plan for refugee protection. Congress 
has never authorized the federal government to prosecute and convict 
refugees for illegal entry or reentry. 
Part I of this Article traces the twisting path that has led the United 
States to prosecute refugees for immigration crimes. Congress has used 
criminal penalties to buttress civil and administrative immigration controls 
on unauthorized entry since the 1920s.23 When Congress began to make 
special allowance for the protection of refugees after World War II, it 
conceptualized criminal immigration law and refugee law as separate 
regulatory regimes.24 Congress’s concern for refugees culminated in the 
Refugee Act of 1980, which established a legal right to safe haven for nearly 
all refugees who reach the United States.25 A core purpose of the Refugee 
Act was to ensure that federal immigration law complied fully with the 
United States’ commitments under the Refugee Protocol, and members of 
Congress vigorously debated what steps would be necessary to accomplish 
this objective. Yet, there is no evidence in the legislative record that either 
the Executive Branch or Congress contemplated the possibility that the 
INA’s criminal provisions might be out of step with Article 31. Indeed, based 
on an exhaustive review of the relevant legislative history—from the INA’s 
passage in 1952 through its numerous amendments over the past sixty-eight 
years—this Article demonstrates that members of Congress have never 
endorsed punishing refugees for illegal entry or reentry on the public record. 
To the contrary, on the rare occasions when the topic has arisen in 
congressional debates, legislators have rejected proposals to introduce civil 
or criminal penalties into the statutory regime for refugee protection.26 
 
 23 See infra Section I.A. 
 24 See infra Section I.B. 
 25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if 
the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because 
of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”). 
Consistent with the Refugee Convention, the INA now carves out exceptions from withholding of 
removal for, inter alia, persecutors, those who have committed serious nonpolitical crimes abroad or 
particularly serious crimes in the United States, and refugees who pose threats to U.S. national security. 
See id. § 1231(b)(3)(B). 
 26 See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
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Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, the federal government 
began to blur the line between ordinary immigration enforcement and 
refugee protection.27 As national authorities reconceptualized border 
enforcement primarily as a national-security issue, DOJ focused more 
resources on prosecuting immigration crimes, causing illegal entry and 
reentry convictions to skyrocket. In response, critics at the time complained 
that DHS, in its zeal to prevent terrorists and criminals from entering the 
United States, was failing to screen undocumented migrants properly to 
prevent the inadvertent prosecution of refugees. 
What started as an incidental byproduct of the United States’ “War on 
Terror” eventually cemented into official agency policy.28 In 2014, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) promulgated formal guidance that 
refugees were appropriate candidates for prosecution.29 Four years later, 
Attorney General Jefferson Sessions announced that federal prosecutors 
would be required to prosecute all undocumented foreign migrants 
apprehended at the U.S.–Mexico border, irrespective of whether the migrants 
were refugees with valid claims to relief in immigration court.30 As a result, 
the Executive Branch is currently committed to prosecuting refugees for 
illegal entry and reentry. 
Part II delivers this Article’s most important contribution by explaining 
why prosecuting refugees violates federal law. In the past, federal judges 
have assumed that the INA’s criminal prohibitions on illegal entry and 
reentry apply fully to refugees because these provisions do not expressly 
exempt refugees from criminal liability. This superficial analysis is gravely 
mistaken. As the Supreme Court has recognized in other contexts, the fact 
that an INA provision does not expressly articulate an exception is not a 
sufficient basis to rule out that such an exception exists.31 This interpretive 
 
 27 See infra Section I.C. 
 28 See infra Section I.D. 
 29 See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-15-95, STREAMLINE: 
MEASURING ITS EFFECT ON ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSING 17 (May 15, 2015) [hereinafter INSPECTOR 
GENERAL], https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2015/OIG_15-95_May15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5JCW-43XC]. 
 30 See Zero-Tolerance, supra note 5; Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to Fed. Prosecutors Along 
the Sw. Border (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1049751/download 
[https://perma.cc/7VRN-L9KA] (discussing the “Zero-Tolerance for Offenses Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)” 
policy). 
 31 See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514–20 (2009) (holding that a provision of the INA, 
which denies asylum and withholding removal to “any person” who has contributed to others’ 
persecution, does not unambiguously foreclose a duress exception); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 
548 U.S. 30, 35 n.4 (2006) (concluding that a provision of the INA, which prohibits refugees from 
receiving “any relief” if they illegally reentered the United States, did not disqualify refugees from 
receiving withholding of removal). 
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principle is particularly salient when the whole text, context, and purpose of 
the INA indicate that exempting refugees from criminal liability is an 
implicit feature of the statute’s overarching legislative design. At a 
minimum, the fact that Congress does not appear to have anticipated criminal 
penalties applying to refugees should counsel caution before courts attribute 
such a meaning to the INA. Instead, courts should bring their entire 
methodological toolbox to bear on the problem, including traditional canons 
of federal statutory interpretation. 
Three venerable canons of statutory interpretation confirm that refugees 
are exempt from prosecution for garden-variety immigration crimes. First, 
the Charming Betsy canon advises courts to avoid interpreting the INA in a 
manner that would undermine the United States’ international obligations.32 
Remarkably, although federal courts have recognized that prosecuting 
refugees violates the United States’ obligations under the Refugee Protocol, 
they have never addressed whether the INA could be interpreted in such a 
manner as to eliminate these conflicts, as Charming Betsy prescribes.33 This 
oversight is regrettable. Applying Charming Betsy to exempt refugees from 
prosecution for illegal entry and reentry would further the Refugee Act’s 
raison d’être: eliminating discrepancies between U.S. refugee law and 
international law.34 It would also advance Charming Betsy’s primary 
purposes: minimizing the potential for friction with foreign powers35 and 
ensuring that the President and Congress take the lead in deciding delicate 
questions about the United States’ compliance with international law.36 
Second, courts should recognize that interpreting the INA to authorize 
refugee prosecution violates the U.S. Constitution. In Robinson v. 
 
 32 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (counseling that “an 
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains”). 
 33 A few scholars have observed that the Charming Betsy canon offers a possible legal basis for 
challenging refugee prosecution, but they have not grounded this claim in a sufficiently rigorous study of 
the INA’s text and legislative history. See Arnpriester, supra note 21, at 41; Thomas M. McDonnell & 
Vanessa H. Merton, Enter at Your Own Risk: Criminalizing Asylum-Seekers, 51 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 94–97 (2019). This Article supplies the missing textual and historical analysis to show why this 
claim is persuasive. 
 34 See infra notes 204–209 and accompanying text. 
 35 See Serra v. Lapin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he purpose of the Charming Betsy 
canon is to avoid the negative ‘foreign policy implications’ of violating the law of nations.” (quoting 
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982))). 
 36 See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the 
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 525 (1997) (emphasizing how the canon 
operates “as a means of both respecting the formal constitutional roles of Congress and the President and 
preserving a proper balance and harmonious working relationship among the three branches of the federal 
government”). 
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California,37 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” does not permit the 
government to punish people based solely on narcotics addiction—a 
circumstance over which they presently have no control.38 Lower courts have 
extended Robinson to other circumstances where an individual’s acts are 
inextricably linked to a status they cannot control. For example, they have 
held that states may not punish homeless people for sleeping in public 
without providing alternative accommodations where homeless people may 
spend the night.39 Another logical application of the Eighth Amendment, I 
argue, is that it enjoins the federal government from punishing refugees—
“the world’s homeless people”40—for illegal entry and reentry when they 
lack adequate protection for their human rights abroad. As applied to 
refugees, criminal penalties for illegal entry and reentry violate Robinson 
because they punish acts that are inextricably linked to refugee status. The 
DOJ’s zero-tolerance policy is therefore unconstitutional as applied to 
refugees. Ultimately, however, federal courts need not reach the merits of 
this novel constitutional question: under the canon of constitutional 
avoidance, the mere fact that refugee prosecution raises grave constitutional 
concerns is reason enough to construe the INA’s criminal provisions to 
exempt refugees.41 
Third, the rule of lenity militates against reading the INA to authorize 
refugee prosecution. When “reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s 
intended scope even after resort to ‘the language and structure, legislative 
history, and motivating policies’ of the statute,” the rule of lenity dictates 
that courts must decide the interpretive question in favor of a criminal 
defendant.42 Applying the rule of lenity makes good sense in this context 
because it would advance the rule’s core purposes by safeguarding 
legislative supremacy,43 promoting legislative accountability,44 and 
constraining prosecutorial discretion to “minimize the risk of selective or 
 
 37 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 38 Id. at 666–67. 
 39 See, e.g., Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 616 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for 
homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (mem.) (2019). 
 40 Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 55 (1971). 
 41 See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916). 
 42 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 
381, 387 (1980)). 
 43 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (justifying lenity based on the principle that 
“legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity”). 
 44 See Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 887 (2004) 
(emphasizing “lenity’s role in advancing the democratic accountability of criminal justice”). 
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arbitrary enforcement.”45 In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the rule of lenity merits special force in the immigration context in light of 
the fact that foreign nationals “cannot vote” in federal elections and therefore 
are “particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation.”46 
Part III assesses whether prosecuting refugees is morally defensible. 
Drawing on foundational principles from the philosophy of criminal law, I 
argue that refugees often have compelling moral justifications and excuses 
for violating domestic immigration controls in order to escape persecution 
abroad. Due to the exigent circumstances that necessitate their flight from 
persecution, refugees routinely lack passports, visas, and other documents 
that would confirm their identity and enable international travel through 
legally authorized channels. Indeed, the more desperate a refugee’s 
circumstances, the less likely it is that she will be able to escape her own 
country without violating other countries’ immigration controls. Refugees 
cannot reasonably be blamed, therefore, for entering the United States 
without authorization in order to avoid death, torture, or other serious harm. 
Measures taken by the Trump Administration between 2017 and 2019 
further strengthen the argument that prosecuting refugees is morally 
indefensible.47 As the White House slashed the number of visas available to 
refugees and prevented refugees from accessing the United States through 
official ports of entry, many refugees found themselves with no practical 
alternative other than to attempt an unauthorized entry. Under these 
circumstances, refugees could reasonably conclude that violating U.S. 
immigration law was morally justified to facilitate their escape from death 
or other serious harm abroad. Indeed, the harder the White House worked to 
prevent refugees from presenting claims for asylum and withholding of 
removal, the stronger the argument has become that prosecuting refugees for 
immigration crimes was unconscionable. 
In sum, this Article lays bare why prosecuting refugees is both morally 
and legally indefensible. By jettisoning this practice, federal prosecutors and 
judges may correct an ongoing miscarriage of justice, while realigning 
domestic immigration policy with Congress’s statutory plan and the United 
States’ international obligation to treat refugees with dignity and 
compassion. 
 
 45 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). 
 46 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 n.19 (2001). 
 47 In March 2020, the United States joined other countries in drastically restricting the admission of 
all foreign nationals in response to the global spread of COVID-19. Recognizing that public-health 
emergencies like the COVID-19 crisis raise special legal and moral concerns, I do not address those 
questions in this Article. 
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I. THE PATH TO REFUGEE PROSECUTION 
To understand why prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry is 
inconsistent with U.S. law, some historical context is essential. This Part 
chronicles how Congress adopted provisions establishing immigration 
crimes, while also making special provision for refugee protection. Although 
Congress has imposed criminal penalties for illegal immigration for almost 
a century, it has never contemplated that refugees would be subject to those 
penalties. To the contrary, Congress designed the INA with the expectation 
that it would comply fully with the United States’ obligations under 
international law—including the Refugee Convention’s requirement to 
refrain from penalizing refugees for unlawful entry. However, far from 
implementing congressional policy, refugee prosecution emerged 
haphazardly as an incidental byproduct of the post-9/11 national-security 
state, when border agents—seeking to tighten border security—began to 
refer irregular migrants for prosecution without regard to their refugee status. 
Surveying the historical record as a whole, it is apparent that the United 
States has stumbled into refugee prosecution without significant public 
deliberation or congressional authorization. 
A. Creating Immigration Crimes 
Our story begins roughly a century ago. Prior to the 1920s, the federal 
government treated entry into the United States as a matter within the 
exclusive province of civil and administrative law. Violating immigration 
controls at the border could trigger serious legal consequences—including 
exclusion or deportation from the United States48—but not criminal 
penalties.49 After the First World War, however, a shifting political landscape 
prompted Congress to reconsider this approach. Public anxiety about 
increasing migration from China, Mexico, and Southern and Eastern Europe, 
coupled with declining demand for unskilled immigrant labor in the post-
WWI economy, emboldened nativist politicians to demand stricter legal 
 
 48 Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, U.S. 
immigration law distinguished between the “exclusion” of migrants at the border prior to a lawful 
admission and the “deportation” of previously admitted foreign nationals. See 5 CHARLES GORDON, 
STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 
§ 64.01 (rev. ed. 2020). Subsequently, however, all inadmissible and deportable foreign nationals are 
subject to “removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
 49 See Flora v. Rustad, 8 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1925) (“It has never been the policy of this 
Government to punish criminally aliens who come here in contravention of our immigration laws. 
Deportation has been the remedy.”). 
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constraints on immigration.50 Against this backdrop, Congress in 1924 
criminalized counterfeiting immigration documents and obtaining such 
documents by fraud.51 The following year, it allocated funding to establish a 
Border Patrol—the first “serious enforcement mechanism against unlawful 
entry.”52 When these measures failed to stem the flow of irregular migrants, 
Congress entertained proposals to make illegal entry itself a criminal offense. 
Supporters of criminalization found their champion in South Carolina 
Senator Coleman Livingston Blease, a resolute segregationist and fierce 
opponent of Mexican immigration.53 Senator Blease introduced draft 
legislation, the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929, to establish the first criminal 
penalties for unauthorized immigration.54 As amended, the bill made illegal 
entry a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in prison, a $1,000 fine, or 
both.55 Reentry following deportation was designated a felony punishable by 
up to two years in prison, a $1,000 fine, or both.56 
The Undesirable Aliens Act had far-reaching consequences. By the end 
of the 1930s, the federal government had prosecuted more than 44,000 
irregular migrants, necessitating the construction of three new penitentiaries 
near the U.S.–Mexico border.57 Yet, despite the considerable resources 
devoted to prosecuting irregular migrants, the Act eventually came to be 
viewed as a failure. Prosecution and mass incarceration did not “seem to 
have the deterrent effect expected” in stemming the flow of Mexican 
immigrants across the southern border,58 while deportation and so-called 
“voluntary” departures coerced by local law enforcement officials proved to 
be more effective at suppressing unauthorized immigration.59 
Over the next four decades, the federal government deemphasized 
criminal enforcement in favor of exclusion, deportation, and voluntary 
 
 50 Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation 
Policy in the United States, 1921–1965, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 69, 75 (2003). 
 51 See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 22, 43 Stat. 153, 165, superseded by Pub. L. 
No. 80-772, § 1542, 62 Stat. 683, 771 (1948). 
 52 Ngai, supra note 50, at 76 & n.14 (discussing the Act of Feb. 27, 1925, 43 Stat. 1049). 
 53 Kelly Lytle Hernández, How Crossing the US-Mexico Border Became a Crime, THE 
CONVERSATION (Apr. 30, 2017, 10:00 PM), http://theconversation.com/how-crossing-the-us-mexico-
border-became-a-crime-74604 [https://perma.cc/9Q54-KUXA]. 
 54 Act of March 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, 45 Stat. 1551. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Hernández, supra note 53. 
 58 SEC’Y OF LAB., ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1933). 
 59 See JOSEPH NEVINS, OPERATION GATEKEEPER 33 (2002) (reporting that deportations and 
voluntary departures between 1929 and 1935 resulted in the departure of 500,000 Mexican nationals and 
suppressed immigration across the U.S.–Mexico border “to a negligible level”). 
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departure.60 However, the prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry 
remained on the books, and in 1952 they were folded into the landmark 
INA.61 At the urging of federal officials, Congress reduced the maximum 
penalty for illegal entry from one year to six months, allowing for the crime 
to be reclassified as a “petty offense” that could be tried in fast-track 
procedures before a magistrate judge without grand jury indictment or jury 
trial.62 
As time went on, the criminalization of U.S. immigration law gained 
renewed popularity. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, legislators from 
both political parties jockeyed to establish their “tough on crime” 
credentials.63 During this period, Congress repeatedly revised the INA, 
adding a variety of immigration-related crimes.64 These statutory 
amendments perpetuated in revised form the longstanding criminal 
prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry. As a result, the INA continues 
to characterize these acts as crimes, with illegal reentry specifically 
designated as a felony punishable by ten or more years in prison.65 Federal 
courts have upheld these criminal penalties as permissible applications of 
Congress’s constitutional power to regulate immigration.66 
B. Legislating Refugee Protection 
Alongside the criminalization of U.S. border control, Congress has also 
established legal safeguards to protect refugees from persecution abroad. 
These safeguards emerged after World War II, inspired in part by 
 
 60 See K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1917–23, 1933 (2019) 
(discussing these trends). Voluntary departure entails a foreign national exiting the United States prior to 
the issuance or enforcement of a removal order. Under current immigration law, voluntary departure has 
become a form of relief that allows those who qualify to avoid the adverse legal consequences of a 
removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (authorizing the Attorney General to grant voluntary departure). 
 61 See INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, §§ 275–76, 66 Stat. 163, 229. 
 62 See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1326–27 (2010). 
 63 See Kari Hong, The Absurdity of Crime-Based Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 2143–
44 (2017) (emphasizing bipartisan consensus about a “tough on crime” approach to immigration). See 
generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. 
U. L. REV. 367, 376, 419 (2006) (discussing the criminalization of U.S. immigration law). 
 64 For a concise summary of these developments, see David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and 
Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 164–175 (2012). 
 65 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a), 1326. 
 66 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235, 238 (1896) (stating that “it would be plainly 
competent for [C]ongress to declare the act of an alien in remaining unlawfully within the United States 
to be an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment, if such offense were to be established by a judicial 
trial”); United States v. Hernandez-Guerrero, 147 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]t no time during 
the last century has any court questioned or contradicted Wong Wing’s endorsement of Congress’s 
prerogative to enact criminal immigration laws.”). 
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international negotiations that produced the Refugee Convention.67 Congress 
gradually strengthened the statutory safeguards for refugees, culminating in 
the United States’ accession to the Refugee Protocol68 and passage of the 
landmark Refugee Act of 1980.69 A consistent theme in the legislative history 
of both the Refugee Protocol and the Refugee Act is Congress’s concerted 
focus on ensuring that domestic law complied fully with the United States’ 
obligations under international law.70 The historical record therefore offers 
powerful evidence that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry is 
inconsistent with Congress’s statutory plan. 
Refugee law as we know it today began to take shape in the United 
States beginning with the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which established 
a special immigrant quota for refugees.71 Although Congress discontinued 
this quota in 1957,72 it authorized the Attorney General to admit specific 
categories of refugees throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, pursuant to 
special “parole” and “conditional entry” programs.73 In 1950, Congress also 
authorized the Attorney General to refrain from deporting foreigners to 
countries where they would be threatened with physical harm.74 
As the United States was implementing these statutory frameworks, 
legal reform was also taking place at the international level. In 1951, the 
Refugee Convention established a new global regime for refugee protection. 
In relevant part, the Refugee Convention defines a “refugee” as 
any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.75 
States–parties to the Refugee Convention commit that they will not 
“expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
 
 67 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 33.01. 
 68 Refugee Protocol, supra note 17. 
 69 Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 70 See infra text accompanying notes 91–95. 
 71 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-744, 62 Stat. 1009, 1010–11, amended by Acts of June 16, 
1960, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219, and June 28, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-60, 65 Stat. 96. 
 72 Act of Sept. 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-316, § 10, 71 Stat. 639, 642. 
 73 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 33.01[1]–[2] (discussing the development of refugee policies 
in the United States after World War II). 
 74 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, § 23, 64 Stat. 987, 1010. Fifteen 
years later, Congress eliminated the requirement that persecution be physical. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. 
L. No. 89-236, § 11(f), 79 Stat. 911, 918. 
 75 Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(A)–(A)(2). 
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account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”76 
The Refugee Convention also anticipates that states might be tempted 
to use civil or criminal sanctions to deter or punish refugee immigration. To 
counter this temptation, Article 31 declares: 
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal 
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their 
life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in 
their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without 
delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.77 
Several features of this text merit unpacking. As a general rule, Article 
31 enjoins states–parties from imposing any penalties—civil or criminal—
based on refugees’ irregular entry or presence. To claim this immunity, 
however, refugees must “com[e] directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened,” “present themselves without delay to the 
authorities,” and “show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”78 The 
Refugee Convention’s preamble and preparatory work (travaux 
préparatoires) underscore that these qualifications are to be construed 
liberally in favor of refugee protection, reflecting the Refugee Convention’s 
overarching objective “to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of 
[the] fundamental rights and freedoms” affirmed by “the Charter of the 
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”79 The 
purpose of these limitations clauses was not to compel refugees to pursue 
asylum in the first country of transit on pain of penalties elsewhere.80 Rather, 
the preparatory work makes clear that these qualifications were designed to 
ensure that refugees who had already received asylum—a durable legal 
status81—in one receiving state would not thereafter have an unfettered right 
 
 76 Id. art. 33(1) (emphasis added). The Convention qualifies this obligation by providing that it does 
not apply, inter alia, if “there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.” Id. art. 33(2). 
 77 Id. art. 31(1). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. pmbl.; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (authorizing recourse to preparatory work when other 
conventional means of interpretation leave a treaty “ambiguous or obscure”). 
 80 See GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF 
REFUGEES: NON-PENALIZATION, DETENTION, AND PROTECTION 5–8 (2001), https:// 
www.unhcr.org/3bcfdf164.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAJ7-5WVM] (prepared at the request of UNHCR for 
an expert roundtable held in Geneva, Switzerland on November 8–9, 2001). 
 81 Unlike refugees who are granted only withholding of removal, a form of temporary relief that 
expires when refugees are no longer threatened with persecution abroad, those who receive asylum may 
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to violate other countries’ border controls without legal repercussions.82 
Hence, refugees do not forfeit their immunity from prosecution under Article 
31 if they travel through other states, provided that they do not establish 
prolonged residence or receive a firm offer of asylum along the way.83 As 
long as refugees travel continuously toward the country where they first seek 
asylum, they are understood to “com[e] directly” from their home country 
for purposes of Article 31, and are entitled to seek refuge without suffering 
civil or criminal penalties for illegal entry in their destination country. 
Although the United States did not join the Refugee Convention, it 
agreed to be bound by Article 31 when it acceded to the Refugee Protocol in 
1968.84 At the time, neither the White House nor Congress appeared to have 
anticipated any conflict between Article 31 and the INA. In his letter 
transmitting the Refugee Protocol for advice and consent, President Lyndon 
B. Johnson assured the Senate that “[a]ccession to the Protocol would not 
impinge adversely upon established practices under existing laws in the 
United States.”85 In his view, there were only “two instances where 
divergences between the Convention and United States laws would cause 
difficulty”—Article 24 (addressing labor law and social security) and Article 
 
apply for permanent residence after one year, bring immediate family members to the United States, and 
eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship. See Benefits and Responsibilities of Asylees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/benefits-
and-responsibilities-asylees [https://perma.cc/9MQV-NATW]. 
 82 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 80, at 5–8. 
 83 See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 396 (2005) 
(explaining that the “coming directly” language of Article 31 “does not disfranchise” refugees who have 
“passed through, or even [have] been provisionally admitted to, another country”); PAUL WEIS, THE 
REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES ANALYZED WITH A COMMENTARY 215, 
219, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951-travaux-
preparatoires-analysed-commentary-dr-paul.html [https://perma.cc/GVG6-TKMK] (summarizing the 
Refugee Convention’s preparatory work as affirming that refugees are not to be penalized simply because 
they “could have sought asylum in another country” en route). Support for this reading can be found in 
Article 31(2), which requires states–parties to give refugees in transit “a reasonable period and all the 
necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.” Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 
31(2). 
 84 See Refugee Protocol, supra note 17, art. 1(1) (“The States Parties to the present Protocol 
undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the [Refugee] Convention . . . .”); Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees: Senate Consideration of Treaty Document 90-27, CONGRESS.GOV 
https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/90th-congress/27?r=2&s=1 [https://perma.cc/F3CM-98V7] 
(noting that the Senate voted 59–0 in favor of ratification on October 4, 1968). The United States did not 
submit any reservations, understandings, or declarations with respect to Article 31. Nor has the Executive 
Branch ever offered a formal interpretation of Article 31 that would call into question the conventional 
understanding reflected in the Convention’s preparatory work. 
 85 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter of Transmittal, Aug. 1, 1968, 114 CONG. REC. 27757, 27757 
(1968) [hereinafter Johnson Letter]. 
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29 (addressing taxation).86 President Johnson stressed that he had proposed 
“appropriate reservations” that would address those differences between the 
Refugee Protocol and U.S. law.87 Subsequent Senate hearings on the Refugee 
Protocol do not reveal any expressions of concern about possible tensions 
between Article 31 and the INA.88 As far as can be discerned from the public 
record, none of the central players in the United States’ adoption of the 
Refugee Protocol contemplated the possibility that the INA could be used to 
prosecute refugees in violation of Article 31. 
A decade later, Congress revisited the relationship between the Refugee 
Protocol and the INA in debates that culminated in the passage of the 
Refugee Act of 1980.89 By the late 1970s, federal policymakers had come to 
recognize that certain aspects of the INA were out of sync with the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol. A primary purpose of the Refugee Act, therefore, 
was to ensure that the United States complied fully with its obligations under 
the Refugee Protocol.90 In addition to amending the INA’s “refugee” 
definition to track the Refugee Convention (Article 1), the Refugee Act 
revised the INA’s provision on withholding of deportation (later restyled as 
“withholding of removal”) to parallel the Refugee Convention’s prohibition 
of refoulement (Article 33).91 Most relevant for present purposes, the 
Refugee Act conformed the INA’s withholding provision to Article 31 by 
providing that refugees would not be denied access to relief in immigration 
court if they had entered the United States unlawfully.92 Congress also 
 
 86 Id.; U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STATE PARTIES, INCLUDING DECLARATIONS AND 
RESERVATIONS, TO THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 5 [hereinafter STATE 
PARTIES], https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/convention/5d9ed66a4 [https://perma.cc/RXE6-
6QF5]. 
 87 Johnson Letter, supra note 85; see also STATE PARTIES, supra note 86; S. COMM. ON FOREIGN 
RELS., PROTOCOL RELATING TO REFUGEES, S. REP. NO. 90-14, at 7 (1968) [hereinafter SENATE 
PROTOCOL REPORT] (“[T]he United States already meets the standards of the Protocol . . . .”). 
 88 See SENATE PROTOCOL REPORT, supra note 87, at 2 (expressing the Senate’s understanding that, 
subject to two unrelated exceptions, “the protocol would not impinge adversely upon the Federal and 
State laws of this country”). 
 89 Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
 90 See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009) (“As this Court has twice recognized, one of 
Congress’ primary purposes in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles agreed to in the 
[Refugee Convention], as well as the [Refugee Protocol].” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 91 See Refugee Act § 202(e); GORDON ET AL., supra note 48, § 33.01[3] (establishing that “[a] 
predominant goal of [the Refugee Act] was to implement the United Nations Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees”). 
 92 By authorizing withholding of removal not only for asylum-seekers in deportation proceedings 
(i.e., those who had previously been formally admitted), but also for asylum-seekers in exclusion 
proceedings (i.e., those who had entered previously without formal admission and would otherwise be 
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authorized the Attorney General to grant asylum on a discretionary basis to 
refugees who were either already in the United States or seeking entry at a 
land border or through a designated port of entry.93 In each of these respects, 
the Refugee Act reflected Congress’s concerted effort to harmonize U.S. 
refugee law with Article 31. 
At no point during the three years of debates that preceded the Refugee 
Act did anyone involved indicate on the public record that additional 
legislative action might be necessary to harmonize the INA with Article 31. 
Though this omission is significant, it is not entirely surprising. Throughout 
this period, federal policymakers generally drew firm distinctions between 
refugees and other migrants, characterizing these categories as distinct 
populations to be handled through separate regulatory regimes. For example, 
Attorney General Griffin Bell emphasized in testimony to Congress that 
“refugee problems,” which posed sensitive questions of foreign policy and 
international law, should not be conflated with the distinct challenge of 
“illegal immigration” by economic migrants, which Congress had 
endeavored to curb through a distinct regulatory regime based on exclusion, 
deportation, and civil and criminal penalties.94 Having distinguished refugees 
from other migrants in this way, the idea that refugees might face prosecution 
for illegal entry and reentry does not appear to have occurred to anyone who 
participated in the congressional deliberations that produced the Refugee 
Act—not to members of Congress, critics of expansive refugee admission, 
refugee rights advocates, or even the Attorney General. 
Congress’s silence on this subject is particularly noteworthy given that 
irregular entry by refugees was a topic of sustained discussion at a critical 
juncture during these debates. Early on, as the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law 
considered proposals that would lead eventually to the Refugee Act, the 
 
faced with “return”), the Refugee Act enabled irregular entrants to qualify for protection from 
refoulement. 
 93 Refugee Act § 208. 
 94 Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Refugees, & Int’l 
L. of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 33 (1979) [hereinafter May 1979 Hearings] (testimony 
of Attorney General Griffin B. Bell); see also id. at 32 (asserting that the “problem of Mexican citizens 
coming across the border to work in our country” was not “a refugee problem”); JOYCE C. VIALET, CONG. 
RSCH. SERV., U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: 1952–1979, at 71–78 (1979) (report prepared at the 
request of Senator Edward Kennedy for inclusion in the congressional record) (distinguishing the entry 
of aliens “illegally, as undocumented aliens” from entry “legally as refugees”); Admission of Refugees 
into the United States Part II: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, and Int’l L. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 187 (1978) (testimony of Leo Cherne) [hereinafter Cherne] 
(observing that the United States has maintained a “decisive distinction between . . . refugees and the host 
of unfortunates who illegally cross our borders to seek work,” given that the former “live lives of total 
repression, pervasive fear, arbitrary arrest and death”). 
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subcommittee chair, Representative Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania, 
introduced a bill that would have disqualified refugees from receiving 
sanctuary if they failed to apply for withholding of deportation promptly 
after an illegal entry or if they failed to show good cause for their illegal 
entry.95 Eilberg’s proposal failed to attract sufficient support in Congress 
after the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the State 
Department opposed it as being “out of character with our traditional concern 
for refugees” and as potentially “result[ing] in a conflict with our obligations 
under section 33 of the refugee protocol.”96 After Eilberg’s proposal was 
eliminated from consideration, but before Congress enacted the Refugee Act, 
representatives of Amnesty International applauded this decision in 
congressional testimony, observing that the proposal would have violated 
Article 31 through the “imposition of penalties on refugees who, under 
certain circumstances, enter the country illegally.”97 
Given all the Sturm und Drang that surrounded Eilberg’s proposal, one 
would expect that if members of Congress believed refugees were subject to 
criminal liability under the INA for illegal entry and reentry, they would have 
attempted to resolve this incongruity with international law in the Refugee 
Act. At a minimum, the issue surely would have received a passing mention 
at some point during the many lengthy hearings that preceded passage of the 
Refugee Act.98 Eilberg’s proposal demonstrates that INS, the State 
 
 95 Extension of Indochina Refugee Assistance Program: Hearings on H.R. 9133, H.R. 9134, and H.R. 
9110 Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, & Int’l L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong. 1, 33 (1977). See generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A 
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 40–41 (1981) (discussing the 
legislative history of Representative Eilberg’s proposal). Eilberg’s proposal appeared in multiple bills 
before dropping out of the final Refugee Act. 
 96 Admission of Refugees into the United States: Hearings on H.R. 3056 Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigr., Citizenship, & Int’l L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 60, 63 (1977) (testimony 
of John W. DeWitt, Deputy Administrator, U.S. State Department, opposing this provision); see also 
Admission of Refugees into the United States, Part II: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., 
Citizenship, & Int’l L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 216–20, 227 (1978) (testimony of 
INS Commissioner Leonel J. Castillo opposing this part of Eilberg’s proposal as “too harsh,” “entirely 
out of line with this country’s humanitarian principles,” and inconsistent with Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention). 
 97 See May 1979 Hearings, supra note 94 (testimony of A. Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum 
emphasizing how this change was necessary to harmonize the INA with Article 31 of the Refugee 
Protocol). 
 98 For a taste of these hearings, see, for example, U.S. Refugee Programs: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1980) (416 pages); The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 
2816, Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations of the H. Comm. of Foreign Affs., 96th Cong. (1979) (104 
pages); May 1979 Hearings, supra note 97 (466 pages); Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigr., Refugees, & Int’l L of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979) (400 
pages). 
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Department, and members of Congress were well aware that refugees were 
entering the United States outside official ports of entry. Yet, the legislative 
history of the Refugee Act does not indicate that members of Congress 
foresaw the possibility that federal prosecutors might try to use the INA to 
punish refugees for illegal entry or reentry. As far as Congress and the 
Executive Branch were concerned, the criminal penalties for illegal entry and 
reentry were designed solely for unauthorized economic migrants, not 
refugees. 
After passing the Refugee Act, Congress continued to tinker with the 
definitions of immigration crimes and their associated penalties. It amended 
the criminal prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry through a series of 
legislative enactments that included the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,99 the 
Immigration Act of 1990,100 the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994,101 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.102 Collectively, the legislative history 
for these acts runs tens of thousands of pages, reflecting Congress’s sustained 
engagement with the challenge of containing unauthorized migration.103 Yet, 
even as Congress repeatedly revised the INA in an effort to “address the 
problem of the ‘revolving door’ at the southern land border” for economic 
migrants,104 no one involved in these debates ever raised the possibility that 
refugees might also be vulnerable to prosecution for illegal entry or reentry. 
The best reading of the historical record as a whole, therefore, is that 
Congress designed the INA’s criminal prohibitions against illegal entry and 
reentry with ordinary economic migrants in mind, believing that refugees 
were subject to different rules. 
C. Stumbling into Refugee Prosecution 
Piecing together how and why the federal government began 
prosecuting refugees requires further detective work. The best available 
 
 99 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7345, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–72. 
 100 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 121(b)(2)–(3), 543(b)(2)–(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 
4994, 5059. 
 101 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 13001, 
108 Stat. 1796, 2023. 
 102 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 307, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-612. 
 103 In preparing to write this Article, my research team reviewed the entire legislative history of 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(a) and 1326, as well as the Refugee Protocol and the Refugee Act. A comprehensive 
list of the relevant materials, comprising tens of thousands of pages, is on file with the author. 
 104 IMMIGRATION IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST ACT OF 1995, H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 155 
(1996). 
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evidence indicates that federal agencies embraced refugee prosecution as 
official Executive Branch policy only relatively recently, after decades of 
rejecting the idea that refugees were criminally liable for illegal entry and 
reentry. 
Prior to the twenty-first century, refugee prosecution appears to have 
been virtually nonexistent. During the 1980s and 1990s, a handful of cases 
popped up in the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement featuring 
criminal defendants who asserted that they were refugees fleeing 
persecution. In nearly all of these cases, prosecutors contested the 
defendants’ assertions that they were refugees, and courts agreed that the 
defendants had failed to prove a well-founded fear of immediate harm in 
their home countries.105 Only two cases involved prosecutors deliberately 
bringing charges against refugees. Further, the record in those cases indicates 
that the defendants were not entitled to enter the United States because they 
had engaged in the persecution of others or had committed particularly 
serious crimes in the United States.106 Thus, federal case law suggests that 
for at least two decades after the Refugee Act, federal prosecutors did not 
deliberately target admissible refugees for prosecution for illegal entry or 
reentry.107 
However, the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought about a sea change in the 
Executive Branch’s approach to immigration enforcement. In the wake of 
the attacks, Congress committed civil immigration enforcement to a new 
agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), reflecting a 
fundamental shift in emphasis toward a more security-focused approach to 
immigration policy.108 DOJ also allocated more resources to the prosecution 
 
 105 See, e.g., United States v. Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Simo, 68 F. Supp. 2d 706, 710–11 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
 106 See United States v. Joya-Martinez, 947 F.2d 1141, 1142 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the 
defendant had been “a member of a death squad and that on eight occasions, under official orders, he 
murdered prisoners after brutal interrogations”); United States v. Nwene, 20 F. Supp. 2d 716, 717–18 
(D.N.J. 1998) (considering the case of an asylum-seeker who had been removed previously based on an 
aggravated felony conviction for bank larceny). 
 107 Given the prevalence of plea bargaining in federal criminal law, it is impossible to rule out the 
possibility that refugee prosecution may have been practiced to some degree during this period. 
Nonetheless, the absence of published decisions reflecting any such practice is noteworthy. At a 
minimum, the absence of any published evidence of refugee prosecution offers a good reason to reject 
the possibility that Congress might have implicitly endorsed the practice when it reenacted §§ 1325(a) 
and 1326 during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 108 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, §§ 101, 402(3), 116 Stat. 2135, 2142, 
2153 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 111). See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration 
Reform, National Security After September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. 
L. REV. 1369, 1373, 1398–1404 (2007) (explaining “how national security concerns have come to 
dominate” immigration policy, sidelining other economic, political, and social concerns). 
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of immigration crimes, causing immigration-related convictions to 
skyrocket. By 2004, federal judges were sentencing over 30,000 people a 
year for immigration crimes—roughly a four-fold increase from a decade 
earlier.109 
In 2005, DHS rolled out a new initiative to tackle unauthorized 
migration across the southern border. Dubbed “Operation Streamline,” this 
program encouraged federal prosecutors to bring criminal charges against  
foreign migrants apprehended for entering the United States without 
inspection.110 First-time offenders would be held in federal prisons pending 
fast-track criminal hearings before magistrate judges, followed by expedited 
removal proceedings or hearings in immigration court.111 For repeat 
offenders, federal prosecutors had a choice. They could charge a foreign 
national with felony illegal reentry and send her to federal district court. 
Alternatively, they could invite her to plead guilty to the lesser offense of 
misdemeanor illegal entry and route her to a magistrate judge for conviction 
and sentencing alongside first-time offenders.112 
During this period, DOJ pressed charges against some refugees who 
entered the United States without inspection.113 For example, in United States 
v. Vazquez-Landaver, federal prosecutors brought criminal charges against 
an asylum-seeker from El Salvador who had used human smugglers to enter 
the United States without inspection after receiving threats from corrupt 
police officers in his home countryx.114 Similarly, in United States v. Xian 
Long Yao, a Chinese national who feared persecution for violating China’s 
one-child policy faced criminal charges for illegally reentering Guam.115 In 
both cases, the Ninth Circuit assumed that the defendants were vulnerable to 
prosecution and rejected the defendants’ necessity and duress defenses.116 
 
 109 Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 
139 (2009). 
 110 Doug Keller, Re-thinking Illegal Entry and Re-entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65, 125–27, 126 n.320 
(2012).  
 111 Id. 
 112 AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, FACT SHEET: PROSECUTING MIGRANTS FOR COMING TO THE UNITED 
STATES (2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-prosecutions 
[https://perma.cc/RKS5-BUT9]. 
 113 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Xian 
Long Yao, 302 F. App’x 586 (9th Cir. 2008); cf. United States v. Malenge (Malenge II), 294 F. App’x 
642 (2d Cir. 2008) (charged based on false personation, misuse of a passport, and false use of a passport); 
United States v. Barry (Barry II), 294 F. App’x 641 (2d Cir. 2008) (same). 
 114 Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d at 800–01, 806. 
 115 Xian Long Yao, 302 F. App’x at 587–88. 
 116 See Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d at 800–01; Xian Long Yao, 302 F. App’x at 587–88. 
115:717 (2020) The Case Against Prosecuting Refugees 
739 
In 2012, the Obama Administration expanded Streamline proceedings 
nationwide, producing another massive spike in the prosecution of 
immigration crimes.117 In 2013 alone, the Justice Department brought over 
91,200 cases for illegal entry and reentry, a 500% increase from a decade 
earlier.118 The following year, half of all federal arrests were for immigration-
related offenses.119 CBP, the division of DHS responsible for apprehending 
irregular migrants at the border, “made more arrests in 2014 (64,954) than 
all of the agencies within DOJ combined (58,265).”120 Flooded with illegal 
entry and reentry cases, magistrates in some locations decided up to eighty 
cases per day,121 often combining a defendant’s initial appearance, 
arraignment, plea, and sentencing into a single hearing.122 Nearly three-
quarters of a million people were prosecuted for illegal entry or reentry 
between 2005 and 2016, at an estimated cost of $7 billion.123 Ninety-nine 
percent of the defendants in these proceedings pleaded guilty.124 As a result, 
federal courts delivered more convictions for illegal entry and reentry during 
this period than for all other federal crimes combined.125 The era of mass 
immigration incarceration was now in full swing. 
As criminal immigration enforcement gained momentum under the 
Bush and Obama Administrations, immigrant-rights advocates expressed 
 
 117 Keller, supra note 110, at 123–24. The Obama Administration eventually rebranded Operation 
Streamline as the “Criminal Consequence Initiative.” Lomi Kriel, Streamlined: Trump Pressing for Mass 
Criminalization of Illegal Border Crossers, HOUS. CHRON., http://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/houston-texas/article/Trump-pressing-for-mass-criminalization-of-11962046.php 
[https://perma.cc/2C57-KGDH]. 
 118 Kriel, supra note 117. This spike in prosecutions coincided with a similarly explosive increase in 
deportations. See ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 2 
(2004) (observing that the United States conducted 438,421 deportations in 2013). 
 119 Kriel, supra note 117. 
 120 John Gramlich & Kristen Bialik, Immigration Offenses Make Up a Growing Share of Federal 
Arrests, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/10/ 
immigration-offenses-make-up-a-growing-share-of-federal-arrests/ [https://perma.cc/Q2AJ-THVP]. 
 121 Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. 
REV. 481, 486 (2010). 
 122 Id.; see also Eagly, supra note 62, at 1351 (quoting defense attorneys who described these 
procedures as a “cattle call” or “assembly line”). 
 123 See JUDITH A. GREENE, BETHANY CARSON & ANDREA BLACK, INDEFENSIBLE: A DECADE OF 
MASS INCARCERATION OF MIGRANTS PROSECUTED FOR CROSSING THE BORDER, at viii (2016); Sklansky, 
supra note 64, at 166. 
 124 Lydgate, supra note 121, at 484. 
 125 Id.; Sklansky, supra note 64, at 166. 
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dismay that Border Patrol agents and federal prosecutors were failing to 
screen out bona fide refugees.126 DHS’s Inspector General reported that 
Border Patrol does not have guidance on whether to refer to Streamline 
prosecution aliens who express fear of persecution or fear of return to their 
home countries. As a result, Border Patrol agents sometimes use Streamline to 
refer aliens expressing such fear to DOJ for prosecution. Using Streamline to 
refer aliens expressing fear of persecution, prior to determining their refugee 
status, may violate U.S. obligations under the 1967 United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States ratified in 1968.127 
The Inspector General noted further that although some Border Patrol 
sectors128 were referring asylum-seekers to federal prosecutors, others 
declined to do so, concluding that refugees were “not the ‘best candidates’ 
for Streamline prosecution.”129 Moreover, CBP “officials at headquarters 
were unsure whether it is permissible to refer aliens expressing fear [of 
persecution] to Streamline.”130 
Spurred by the Inspector General’s inquiry, CBP doubled down on 
refugee prosecution: 
CBP . . . responded that it is imperative the criminal and administrative 
processes be separate avenues. Inclusion in one does not exclude inclusion in 
the other. CBP can prosecute an undocumented alien criminally, while at the 
same time the alien makes a claim to credible fear administratively. Neither 
process affects the outcome of the other. The fact that an undocumented alien 
is being prosecuted does not influence the outcome of his or her credible fear 
claim. The claim of credible fear cannot be used as a criterion to exclude an 
undocumented alien from a possible prosecution for a criminal act.131 
Consistent with new policy, the Chief of Border Protection issued a 
guidance memorandum in November 2014 directing that unlawful entrants 
in Streamline proceedings should be referred for prosecution, irrespective of 
whether they claimed a credible fear of persecution abroad.132 
 
 126 Emily Puhl, Prosecuting the Persecuted: How Operation Streamline and Expedited Removal 
Violate Article 31 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees and 1967 Protocol, 25 BERKELEY LA RAZA 
L.J. 87, 94 (2015). 
 127 INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 16. 
 128 Border Patrol sectors are centrally supervised CPB divisions comprised of stations from which 
Border Patrol agents operate. See Border Control Sectors, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., 
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors [https://perma.cc/982Z-
56GC]. 
 129 INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 17. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
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Refugee prosecution became further entrenched in Executive Branch 
policy after Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. Just days after 
taking office, President Trump signed an executive order calling on the 
Attorney General to make prosecuting immigration crimes a “high 
priority.”133 Attorney General Jeff Sessions later implemented this direction 
by issuing an official “zero tolerance” policy for irregular immigration along 
the southern border.134 U.S. Attorney’s Offices would thereafter be required 
“to prosecute all Department of Homeland Security referrals of [illegal entry 
and reentry] violations, to the extent practicable.”135 
Immigration prosecutions once again rose dramatically.136 Over the 
twelve months following Attorney General Sessions’s announcement of the 
zero-tolerance policy, DOJ initiated over 8,000 prosecutions for immigration 
crimes every single month.137 Although not expressly targeted at refugees per 
se, the zero-tolerance policy established a department-wide expectation that 
prosecutors would endeavor (within the limits of available resources) to 
bring charges against every foreign national who attempted illegal entry or 
reentry, irrespective of refugee status.138 Consequently, defense attorneys 
observed a spike in the number of asylum-seekers targeted for prosecution 
after the zero-tolerance policy arrived on the scene.139 
D. Misjudging Refugees 
As criminal charges against asylum-seekers have flooded federal 
courts, district judges and magistrates who handle these cases have 
 
 133 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 134 Zero-Tolerance, supra note 5. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 4 (“After implementing Sessions’ memos, the federal 
court in Tucson, Arizona went from hearing between 10 and 40 cases a day to regularly hearing 75 per 
day—an increase fueled by prosecutions of first-time entrants.”); Ingrid V. Eagly, The Movement to 
Decriminalize Border Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 1984–86 (2020) (documenting a sharp spike in 
prosecutions for illegal entry after the zero-tolerance announcement). 
 137 See TRAC, supra note 8 (providing a chart tracking monthly immigration prosecutions during 
this period). 
 138 See Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks Discussing the Immigration 
Enforcement Actions of the Trump Administration (May 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-discussing-immigration-enforcement-actions 
[https://perma.cc/C92V-9LHD] (announcing that “the Department of Homeland Security is now referring 
100 percent of illegal Southwest Border crossings to the Department of Justice for prosecution” and that 
“the Department of Justice will take up those cases”). 
 139 See HUM. RTS. FIRST, ZERO-TOLERANCE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: PUNISHING ASYLUM 
SEEKERS AND SEPARATING FAMILIES 1 (2018) (“Criminal prosecutions of asylum seekers . . . have 
sharply increased since the implementation of the zero-tolerance policy, with many federal courts 
experiencing record high numbers.”). 
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concluded that a defendant’s refugee status does not preclude criminal 
prosecution.140 For example, Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco, who has 
presided over Streamline proceedings in Tucson, has asserted: “We have 
criminal courts and civil immigration courts. A credible claim of fear is no 
defense to a criminal prosecution.”141 His colleague, Magistrate Judge Eric J. 
Markovich, has offered a similar assessment: 
Defense lawyers will frequently say their client has a ‘credible fear’ of being 
returned to their home country. I tell people that they’ll have to bring this up 
later in immigration court. I don’t mean to cut people off, but I’m not an 
immigration judge and I have no real legal authority to do anything about this 
issue.142 
Comparable statements appear in recent opinions of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals and federal district courts.143 These courts have simply assumed that 
refugees are vulnerable to prosecution for illegal entry and reentry without 
engaging in a rigorous way with the INA’s text, context, and purpose. Nor 
have they considered whether refugee prosecution under the INA is 
consistent with traditional canons of federal statutory interpretation, such as 
the Charming Betsy canon, the canon on constitutional avoidance, and the 
rule of lenity. The conventional wisdom today, therefore, is that the 
prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry apply equally to refugees and 
nonrefugees alike. 
One tragic consequence is that courts have allowed refugees detained 
at the border to be separated from their accompanying children. In United 
States v. Vasquez-Hernandez,144 the Fifth Circuit held that asylum-seekers 
 
 140 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 9 (“While deciding an asylum claim in the first 
instance is beyond the jurisdiction of federal district and magistrate courts, Human Rights First did not 
observe a single case in which a federal judge hesitated to convict and sentence asylum seekers—other 
than occasionally offering brief words of sympathy . . . .”). 
 141 GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 110 (quoting Magistrate Judge Velasco). Notably, 
Judge Velasco has been a vocal critic of Operation Streamline. See Tom Roberts, A ‘Maddening’ System, 
from Courtrooms to Shelters, NAT’L CATH. REP. (July 1, 2011), https://www.ncronline.org/ 
news/maddening-system-courtrooms-shelters [https://perma.cc/KU9M-HZ5X] (discussing Judge 
Velasco’s criticisms). 
 142 GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 110 (quoting Magistrate Judge Markovich); see 
also Kriel, supra note 117 (describing how Magistrate Judge Collis White told asylum-seekers in Del 
Rio, Texas that “there was nothing he could do in this court,” so “[t]hey would have to take up their 
claims with an immigration officer after serving their sentence”). 
 143 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 924 F.3d 164, 1669 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding 
that asylum-seekers are “alien[s]” under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), and that “[q]ualifying for asylum under 
8 U.S.C. § 1158 would not change [their] alien status”); United States v. Ramirez-Ortiz, 370 F. Supp. 3d 
1151, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (asserting that “a plain reading of the statutes suggests that . . . Congress 
chose not to grant immunity to asylum seekers who face criminal prosecution”). 
 144 924 F.3d at 164. 
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from El Salvador and Honduras could not invoke their refugee status as a 
basis for avoiding criminal detention and family separation pending their 
prosecution for illegal entry.145 The court explained that the defendants had 
not “shown that qualifying for asylum would be relevant to whether they 
improperly entered, since [the INA’s prohibition against illegal entry] 
applies to ‘[a]ny alien’ who ‘enters or attempts to enter the United States at 
any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers.’”146 
Because the defendants had previously “stipulated that they were aliens and 
entered the United States at a place that was not a port of entry,”147 the court 
reasoned that they were proper targets for prosecution under the INA and 
that their separation from their children pending their criminal trials was 
therefore permissible. 
When federal judges tell asylum-seekers that they cannot invoke their 
well-founded fear of persecution as a defense to prosecution, the vast 
majority simply plead guilty.148 Occasionally, however, refugees have 
attempted to escape criminal liability by arguing that their well-founded fear 
of persecution abroad supports a necessity or duress defense. However, 
federal courts have not been kind to these arguments. Almost without 
exception, they have concluded that the harms refugees fear are not 
sufficiently “imminent” to qualify for common law necessity or duress 
defenses.149 Moreover, courts have held that these defenses are not ordinarily 
available to refugees because refugees cannot prove that violating U.S. 
immigration controls was the only option reasonably available to them to 
guarantee their safety.150 The upshot of these decisions seems to be that a 
 
 145 Id. at 168–69. 
 146 Id. at 169. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 5, 19–20. 
 149 See, e.g., United States v. Bonilla-Siciliano, 643 F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
defendant’s “generalized fear of harm from the government and gang members . . . did not make a prima 
facie showing” of “an imminent threat of harm”); United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 802–
03 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that an asylum-seeker fleeing a threat of persecution in El Salvador had 
no duress defense because “[a] threat raising the possibility of action after thirty days does not meet the 
requirements of ‘immediacy,’” and he was not “escaping an immediate threat of harm” at the moment 
“he violated the law by crossing the border” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. 
Brizuela, No. B-13-CR-476-1, 2014 WL 2257405, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2014) (“Defendant’s 
testimony that he generally feared for his life in El Salvador . . . is insufficient to meet the imminent harm 
element of duress.”); United States v. Ramirez-Chavez, No. 13–00490 DAE, 2013 WL 3581959, at *4 
(W.D. Tex. July 2, 2013) (“Fear of future harm does not satisfy the present, imminent, and impending 
threat requirement.”). 
 150 See, e.g., Bonilla-Siciliano, 643 F.3d at 591 (holding that a defendant from El Salvador could not 
“show that he lacked a reasonable, legal alternative to illegally reentering the United States, because he 
did not exclude the option of going to a country other than the United States or the handful of others that 
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refugee cannot make out a successful necessity or duress defense unless her 
persecutors chase her literally all the way to the U.S. border.151 
Surprisingly, the more basic predicate for refugee prosecution—the 
assumption that the INA’s criminal provisions apply to refugees—has yet to 
be subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny. Federal judges simply take for 
granted that refugees can be prosecuted for illegal entry and reentry. On 
occasion, some have criticized refugee prosecution, lamenting that the 
practice “is fundamentally inconsistent with the policies and obligations of 
the federal government with regard to the treatment of refugees.”152 Thus far, 
however, legal scholars and defense attorneys have not presented courts with 
a successful argument for disallowing the practice entirely. 
II. IS PROSECUTING REFUGEES LEGALLY DEFENSIBLE? 
In this Part, I make the case that the INA does not, in fact, authorize 
federal courts to penalize refugees for illegal entry or reentry. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, I show that the text, context, and purpose of the INA 
offer substantial grounds to question the legality of refugee prosecution. 
Moreover, traditional principles of federal statutory interpretation counsel 
against interpreting the INA to authorize criminal penalties against refugees 
for illegal entry and reentry. Federal prosecutors should therefore abandon 
refugee prosecution, and federal courts should hold that prosecuting refugees 
is legally indefensible. 
A. Text, Context, and Purpose 
In discerning whether Congress has authorized refugee prosecution, the 
natural starting point for analysis is the statutory text.153 Specifically, our 
inquiry must begin with the two provisions in Title 8 of the United States 
Code that criminalize illegal entry and reentry: §§ 1325(a) and 1326. 
 
he stated were dangerous”); United States v. Grainger, 239 F. App’x 188, 191–92 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that an asylum-seeker who could have taken refuge in Canada on his way to the United States 
could not establish a necessity defense). See generally United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) 
(“[I]f there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, ‘a chance both to refuse to do the 
criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,’ the [duress and necessity] defenses will fail.”). 
 151 Compare United States v. Solorzano-Rivera, 368 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (characterizing 
the defendant’s testimony that “chased by the police, he jumped over the 15-foot-high border fence” as 
“central to his duress defense”), with Ramirez-Chavez, 2013 WL 3581959, at *4 (rejecting the defendant’s 
duress defense because his kidnappers near the U.S.–Mexico border “were not in hot pursuit” when he 
“slipped away . . . unnoticed” and “crossed the Rio Grande river without anyone pursuing him”). 
 152 Malenge II, 294 F. App’x 642, 645 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 153 See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 283 (2011) (“We begin, as in any 
case of statutory interpretation, with the language of the statute.”). 
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Section 1326, which imposes criminal penalties for illegal reentry, 
contains language that easily can be interpreted as exempting refugees from 
prosecution. Although the text purports to authorize criminal penalties 
against “any alien” who illegally reenters the country, it immediately pivots 
to exclude from liability any foreign migrant who “establish[es] that he was 
not required to obtain [the Attorney General’s] advance consent [to 
admission] under this chapter or any prior Act.”154 Since most refugees 
qualify to enter the United States without obtaining the Attorney General’s 
discretionary consent in advance,155 the most natural reading of § 1326 is that 
refugees enjoy immunity from criminal liability for illegal reentry.156 Thus, 
while the text of § 1326 is not free from ambiguity, there is a powerful 
argument that it does not apply on its face to refugees. 
Section 1325(a) uses broad language to authorize criminal penalties 
against 
[a]ny alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter the United States at any time or 
place other than as designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes 
examination or inspection by immigration officers, or (3) attempts to enter or 
obtains entry to the United States by a willfully false or misleading 
representation or the willful concealment of a material fact.157 
On first impression, the words “[a]ny alien” might appear to encompass 
refugees. When courts encounter the word “any” in federal statutes, they 
usually interpret it expansively in accordance with its ordinary semantic 
meaning.158 In light of this established practice, it is not hard to see why 
 
 154 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 
 155 See id. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (providing that withholding of removal is not subject to the Attorney 
General’s discretion); cf. id. § 1158(a)(1) (providing that refugees may qualify for asylum “irrespective 
of [their immigration] status” and regardless of whether “[they are] at a designated port of arrival”). Under 
the Refugee Convention and the INA, limited exceptions apply to refugees who are subject to exclusion 
based on their having participated in the persecution of others on account of a protected ground, their 
commission of a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States, or where there are “reasonable 
grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.” Id. § 1231(b)(3)(B); see 
also Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(F) (excluding refugees from the Convention’s protection 
for these reasons). 
 156 See Gomez-Lopez v. United States, Nos. CV–14–0435–PHX–FJM (JFM), CR–12–0596–PHX–
FJM, 2014 WL 4639517, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2014) (noting that defendant had raised this 
argument, but dismissing the case as time-barred); Puhl, supra note 126, at 104–05 (advancing this 
argument). So far, this reading has not gained traction with federal prosecutors and judges. See, e.g., 
United States v. Castro-Rivas, 180 F. App’x 528, 528–29 (5th Cir. 2006) (concluding that refugees are 
subject to criminal liability for illegal reentry). 
 157 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
 158 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an 
expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” (quoting WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (1976))); Hui Ran Mu v. Barr, 936 F.3d 929, 933–35 (9th 
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judges and prosecutors have concluded time and again that § 1325(a) applies 
to refugees.159 
Nonetheless, this reading is too simplistic. As the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia and Bryan Garner have recognized, even “[s]eemingly absolute 
criminal prohibitions” that use capacious terms like “any” and “every” can 
sustain limiting interpretations.160 This is most obviously true in the criminal 
context, where Congress legislates against a rich backdrop of substantive 
interpretive canons.161 It is also true of federal refugee law, where the 
Supreme Court has held that seemingly absolute prohibitions may support 
implicit exceptions that are necessary to fulfill the Refugee Act’s 
humanitarian purposes.162 This approach reflects the Court’s recognition that 
maintaining a blinkered focus on particular provisions of the INA, without 
attending to how those individual threads fit into the statute’s broader 
tapestry for refugee protection, can produce distorted readings that do 
violence to the INA’s overarching purposes.163 For this reason, the Court has 
taken special care to avoid interpretive myopia by considering the INA’s full 
text, history, and purposes whenever it seeks to discern the meaning of 
particular provisions. 
An illuminating example of this approach is Negusie v. Holder,164 where 
the Supreme Court examined an INA provision that bars “any person” from 
receiving asylum or withholding of removal if she has contributed to the 
 
Cir. 2019) (holding that the words “any alien” have a broad meaning that reaches derivative beneficiaries 
of a visa recipient); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 101 (2012) (discussing the general-terms canon, which provides that “general words,” 
absent “some indication to the contrary,” should “be accorded their full and fair scope”). 
 159 See, e.g., supra note 143. 
 160 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 158, at 106; see also Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. 
Ct. 1743, 1750–51 (2019) (concluding in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas that the “context” of the 
Class Action Fairness Act “demonstrates that Congress did not” mean for a provision authorizing “any 
defendant” to remove a class action to federal court to authorize removal by counterclaim defendants); 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[W]e are not to read general 
words, such as [the words ‘[e]very person’] in this Act, without regard to the limitations customarily 
observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers.”). 
 161 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 158, at 106 (emphasizing that mens rea canons narrow even 
criminal prohibitions that are phrased in absolute terms (e.g., “no person may”)). 
 162 See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 519–20 (2009). 
 163 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“The meaning—or 
ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”); Davis v. 
Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction 
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.”); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988) (“Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.”). 
 164 555 U.S. 511. 
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persecution of others.165 The central question in Negusie was whether this 
“persecutor bar” applied “even if the [petitioner]’s assistance in persecution 
was coerced or otherwise the product of duress.”166 The government asserted 
that because the statutory text did not articulate an express exception for acts 
committed under coercion or duress, no such exception could be inferred.167 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed: 
The silence is not conclusive. The question is whether the statutory text 
mandates that coerced actions must be deemed assistance in persecution. On 
that point the statute, in its precise terms, is not explicit. Nor is this a case where 
it is clear that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue.168 
The Court concluded therefore that it should “look not only to the 
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and 
to its object and policy,”169 including the statute’s evident purpose “to 
implement the principles agreed to in the [Refugee Convention and 
Protocol].”170 Because these contextual considerations did not definitively 
resolve the textual ambiguity, the Court remanded the case to the agency for 
further consideration.171 
The Court followed a similar approach in Fernandez-Vargas v. 
Gonzales.172 The controversy in Fernandez-Vargas centered on the INA 
section that disqualifies refugees from receiving “any relief” from removal 
if they entered the United States outside a designated port of entry after 
having received a final order of removal.173 Notwithstanding the seemingly 
absolute prohibition against “any relief,” the Supreme Court followed the 
Attorney General’s lead in construing the provision narrowly to disallow 
only discretionary forms of relief from removal (i.e., asylum), while leaving 
intact nondiscretionary relief (i.e., withholding of removal and protection 
 
 165 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 166 555 U.S. at 514 (paraphrasing the BIA’s determination that the “persecutor bar” does apply to the 
circumstances in question). 
 167 Id. at 518 (citing the government’s brief). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 519 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 16 (2008)). 
 170 Id. at 520 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 
(1999)). 
 171 Id. at 523–25; see also id. at 525 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing that the persecutor bar is 
materially ambiguous). Only Justice Clarence Thomas concluded that the absence of an explicit 
voluntariness requirement in the persecutor bar precluded interpreting the provision to include an implicit 
coercion or duress exception. See id. at 551–54 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 172 548 U.S. 30 (2006). 
 173 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). 
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under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)).174 Although the Court did not 
offer a robust defense of this interpretation, it apparently concluded that the 
provision was sufficiently ambiguous—given the INA’s overarching 
commitment to refugee protection—to justify deference to the Attorney 
General’s narrowing interpretation.175 Consequently, the INA’s seemingly 
categorical bar to “any relief” has not prevented lower courts from declaring 
that “withholding from removal and CAT protection—both forms of 
[nondiscretionary] relief—are actually still available to individuals in 
reinstatement proceedings.”176 
Taking cues from these cases, federal courts should acknowledge that 
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 are ambiguous with respect to whether they apply to 
refugees. This is most evident in § 1326, which specifies that all those who 
need not gain advance consent from the Attorney General for admission are 
free from criminal liability for illegal reentry. Although § 1325(a) does not 
contain similar language, Congress’s “silence” on this score “is not 
conclusive” because “the statute, in its precise terms, is not explicit” as to 
whether refugees—who qualify for admission irrespective of where they 
enter the United States—are subject to criminal penalties for illegal entry.177 
Just like the Negusie petitioner, refugees can show that their acts were 
compelled by threats to their life or basic freedom, thereby justifying and 
excusing their irregular migration into the United States. At a minimum, 
these factors raise serious questions about whether refugees—a distinctive 
category of migrants who are eligible for admission under the INA—can be 
prosecuted for illegal entry or reentry. 
 
 174 See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35 n.4; 8 C.F.R. § 1241.8(e) (“If an alien [who] . . . has been 
reinstated . . . expresses a fear of returning to the country designated in that order, the alien shall be 
immediately referred to an asylum officer for an interview to determine whether the alien has a reasonable 
fear of persecution or torture . . . .”); cf. id. § 1208.16(c)(4) (prescribing procedures for evaluating claims 
to CAT relief in such cases); id. § 1208.31(e) (prescribing procedures for evaluating claims to withholding 
of removal in such cases). 
 175 See Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 35 n.4 (“Notwithstanding the absolute terms in which the bar 
on relief is stated, even an alien subject to § 241(a)(5) may seek withholding of removal . . . , or under 
[CAT] . . . .”). 
 176 Cazun v. Att’y Gen., 856 F.3d. 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 177 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009). When Congress includes an express exception “in 
one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 
1972)). This presumption makes little sense as applied to the relationship between §§ 1325(a) and 1326, 
however, because it would lead to the absurd result that refugees could be prosecuted for an initial 
irregular entry, but not for reentering immediately after a previous order of removal. 
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Expanding the frame of reference to the full text of the INA and related 
legislation offers further illumination.178 The Refugee Act’s preambular 
statement of purpose emphasizes that the Act’s provisions—which do not 
mention penalties of any kind—constitute the United States’ 
“comprehensive” regulatory framework for refugee admissions.179 This 
declaration is consistent with the INA’s historical development through its 
various amendments—a process that reflects Congress consistently 
distinguishing nonrefugee migrants (to whom the criminal prohibitions 
against illegal entry and reentry would apply) from refugees (who were to 
receive special solicitude, consistent with the Refugee Protocol). Moreover, 
the notion that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 apply to refugees is counterintuitive, 
given that the INA expressly permits refugees to access asylum and 
withholding of removal irrespective of where or how they entered the United 
States.180 These features of the INA reflect Congress’s commitment to protect 
all refugees at or within the United States’ borders—including those who 
entered U.S. territory outside an official port of entry. Thus, even if the full 
text of the INA and the Refugee Act might not conclusively foreclose the 
possibility that refugees are criminally liable for illegal entry and reentry, at 
a minimum they offer substantial reasons to question that conclusion. 
A defender of refugee prosecution might draw attention to other 
features of the INA’s full text. For example, the INA expressly authorizes 
the Attorney General to exempt refugees from civil fines for failure to 
present for inspection the travel documents they used to reach the United 
States through a common carrier.181 If Congress expressly provided for a 
waiver of civil liability in § 1324c, doesn’t this mean that other provisions in 
the INA that don’t provide a waiver, such as §§ 1325(a) and 1326, should be 
understood to authorize penalties against refugees (inclusio unius est 
exclusio alterius)? 
Not likely. To be sure, the fact that one provision in an act contains an 
express exception while another in the same act does not often offers 
valuable insight into Congress’s intent.182 This inference is not persuasive as 
 
 178 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 158, at 167 (observing that “no interpretive fault is more 
common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider 
the entire text, in view of its structure and the physical and logical relation of its many parts”). 
 179 See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 180 Pursuant to the Refugee Act, refugees may qualify for asylum and withholding of removal 
“irrespective of [their immigration] status” and “whether or not [they are] at a designated port of arrival.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (withholding of removal). 
 181 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(6), (d)(7). 
 182 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (“[W]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
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applied to § 1324c, however, because it ignores a key difference between 
that provision and §§ 1325(a) and 1326. Namely, when Congress amended 
§ 1324c(a)(6) of the INA in 1996 to authorize civil fines against foreign 
nationals who failed to present travel documents to immigration officers,183 
it targeted conduct outside the scope of the United States’ obligations under 
the Refugee Protocol. The Refugee Protocol does not obligate the United 
States to refrain from penalizing refugees for failing to present the travel 
documents they used to reach a port of entry. Accordingly, the then-
prevailing understanding that the INA exempted refugees from penalties for 
illegal entry and reentry would not have covered this conduct. If Congress 
wanted to exempt refugees from civil penalties under § 1324c(a)(6), it could 
not rely on courts to use the Refugee Protocol as an interpretive guide; rather, 
it would have to make this exception textually unambiguous. Congress 
therefore had special reason to make explicit that the Attorney General could 
waive these “new civil penalties” for refugees.184 This “special need for an 
express provision undermines any temptation to invoke the interpretive 
maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.”185 
The INA’s legislative history further supports the view that Congress 
has not authorized refugee prosecution for illegal entry and reentry. As 
explained in Part I, a “primary purpose[]” of the Refugee Act was to ensure 
that U.S. immigration law satisfied the United States’ obligations under the 
Refugee Protocol.186 Although Congress spent three years refining the 
Refugee Act to ensure that U.S. immigration law would satisfy the Refugee 
Protocol, no participant in these debates—including the Attorney General,  
the federal government’s chief law enforcement officer—appears to have 
believed that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 were inconsistent with Article 31 of the 
Refugee Convention.187 Viewed in historical context, therefore, the absence 
of any reference to refugee prosecution in the legislative record is a 
 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Russello, 464 U.S. at 23)); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 
(1981) (placing weight on the fact that Congress had included a voluntariness limitation in one provision 
of the Displaced Persons Act but not in another provision). 
 183 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 212, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-570–71 (1996).  
 184 Id. 
 185 Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010). 
 186 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the legislative history 
of . . . the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee 
law into conformance with the [Refugee Protocol].”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 18 (1979) 
(memorializing the House Judiciary Committee’s conclusion that the Refugee Act was necessary to 
ensure “that U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our legal obligations under international agreements”). 
 187 See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
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paradigmatic example of “the [watch] dog that did not bark” in the night.188 
Had members of Congress foreseen that criminal penalties might apply to 
refugees, it is unimaginable that this would have escaped comment during 
the deliberations that produced the Refugee Convention—particularly given 
that members of Congress were keenly aware that refugees were entering the 
United States outside designated ports of entry.189 On the rare occasion when 
members of Congress addressed the prospect of penalizing refugees for 
illegal entry, the idea excited fierce resistance from the Executive Branch 
and was soundly rejected by members of Congress based on concerns that it 
would be morally unconscionable and violate the United States’ international 
obligations.190 Moreover, when Congress later amended §§ 1325(a) and 1326 
in the 1980s and 1990s, legislators gave no sign that they anticipated 
refugees would be subject to prosecution. To the contrary, they appear to 
have contemplated that asylum-seekers at the border would receive refugee 
status determinations, only after which they might face prosecution for 
illegal entry or reentry if an asylum officer or immigration judge rejected 
their petitions for protection.191 
 
 188 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (citing Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 
THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335 (1927)); see also id. at 396 (“We reject that construction because 
we are convinced that if Congress had such an intent, Congress would have made it explicit in the statute, 
or at least some of the Members would have identified or mentioned it at some point in the unusually 
extensive legislative history . . . .”); cf. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In a case where the construction of legislative language such as this makes 
so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives 
may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.”). In INS v. St. Cyr, the 
Supreme Court relied in part on a similar inference from legislative history to support its holding that 
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and IIRIRA did not apply retroactively 
to petitions for discretionary relief filed before these acts entered force. 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.44 (2001) 
(first citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991); and then citing Harrison v. PPG Industries, 
Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (supporting this proposition)). Outside the 
immigration context, the Court has applied similar inferences from legislative silence in a variety of cases. 
See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 91 (2007) (placing weight on the 
fact that “[n]o one” involved in deliberations over the federal Impact Aid Act “expressed the view that 
this statutory language . . . was intended to require, or did require, the Secretary to change the 
Department’s system of calculation”); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (“[T]he fact that 
[impacts on federalism] are not even discussed in the legislative history . . . strongly suggests that 
Congress did not intend that the Travel Act should apply to criminal activity solely because that activity 
is at times patronized by persons from another State.”). 
 189 See supra text accompanying notes 95–97. 
 190 See supra text accompanying notes 95–97. 
 191 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104-
828, pt. 2, at 209–10 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (outlining these procedures for refugee status determinations 
and explaining that under IIRIRA, asylum-seekers who are unsuccessful in establishing their refugee 
status in immigration court may not collaterally challenge their removal orders in subsequent criminal 
prosecutions for illegal entry or reentry). 
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Taking this historical context into account, it seems reasonable to infer 
that when Congress last amended §§ 1325(a) and 1326, without changing the 
text of these provisions, it implicitly endorsed the contemporaneous 
understanding that refugees were not subject to criminal liability.192 Although 
this inference might not place the meaning of §§ 1325(a) and 1326 beyond 
all doubt, it bolsters the conclusion that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry 
and reentry would not reflect “a fair understanding of the legislative plan” 
for refugee protection as set out in the Refugee Act.193 
Thus, attention to the whole text, context, and purposes of the INA 
raises serious reasons to doubt whether §§ 1325(a) and 1326 apply to 
refugees. When seeking to resolve the lingering ambiguity in these 
provisions, the judiciary should bear in mind that “criminal laws are for 
courts, not for the Government, to construe.”194 Hence, the interpretations 
that DHS and DOJ have offered for §§ 1325(a) and 1326 are not entitled to 
any deference in federal courts.195 Instead, the courts should seek guidance 
from traditional tools of federal statutory interpretation. 
B. Canons of Statutory Interpretation 
Three interpretive canons, in particular, confirm that refugees are not 
criminally liable for illegal entry or reentry: the Charming Betsy canon, the 
canon on constitutional avoidance, and the rule of lenity. 
1. The Charming Betsy Canon 
Although conventional wisdom holds that the Refugee Protocol is a 
non-self-executing treaty,196 courts may still use the Refugee Protocol as a 
 
 192 See United States v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compañia, 209 U.S. 337, 339 (1908) (“[R]e-
enactment by Congress, without change, of a statute which had previously received long-continued 
executive construction, is an adoption by Congress of such construction.”). 
 193 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015) (“A fair reading of legislation demands a fair 
understanding of the legislative plan.”); cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
142–43 (2000) (concluding that although tobacco products could not be deemed “safe” within the 
meaning of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the legislative record as a whole indicated that Congress 
implicitly exempted cigarettes from the Act’s coverage). 
 194 Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014). 
 195 See United States v. Apel, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014) (“[W]e have never held that the 
Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.”). 
 196 Federal courts have overwhelmingly rejected the idea that the Refugee Protocol endows migrants 
with rights that are enforceable in domestic courts. See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez-Luna, No. 18-
mj-11463-WQH, 2019 WL 338947, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2019) (“The Protocol does not confer 
judicially enforceable rights that preclude his prosecution under [§ 1325(a)] for eluding inspection and 
examination.”); United States v. Guevara-Medina, No. 18-mj-9443 BTM, 2018 WL 3970092, at *1 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 20, 2018) (“Defendant cannot rely on Article 31(1) of the Protocol to challenge his [§ 1325(a)] 
prosecution.”); United States v. Munoz, No. CR-17-1078 PHX DGC, 2017 WL 4922047, at *3 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 30, 2017) (holding that a defendant “acquired no rights under the 1967 Protocol” and “accordingly 
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guide to the meaning of §§ 1325(a) and 1326. According to the venerable 
Charming Betsy canon of statutory interpretation, which takes its name from 
the 1804 case Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, “an act of Congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.”197 The Charming Betsy canon establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that when courts encounter statutory ambiguity, they should 
select an interpretation that satisfies the United States’ obligations under 
international law.198 This presumption minimizes the potential for friction 
with foreign powers199 and ensures that decisions about the United States’ 
compliance with international law remain firmly in the hands of the 
politically accountable President and Congress.200 
Federal courts have expressed divergent views about what kind of 
evidence would be sufficient to rebut the Charming Betsy presumption. On 
some occasions, courts have asserted that the presumption can be overcome 
only by a clear statement from Congress.201 In other cases, they have asked 
 
cannot rely on these international agreements as a basis for dismissing his [§ 1326] indictment”). Some 
legal scholars have argued that some of the Refugee Protocol’s provisions are self-executing. See 
McDonnell & Merton, supra note 33, at 78–94 (arguing for the self-executing nature of Article 31); 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The “Self-Executing” Character of the Refugee Protocol’s Nonrefoulement 
Obligation, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 39 (1993) (arguing for the self-executing nature of Article 33). This 
conclusion has become less certain since the Supreme Court indicated in Medellín v. Texas that it might 
require a clear statement in a treaty’s text or ratification history before it will interpret the treaty to be 
self-executing. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 517 (2008). But see Carlos Manuel Vázquez, 
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. 
L. REV. 599, 646–67 (2008) (disputing this reading of Medellín). But even if Article 31 is self-executing, 
a Charming Betsy analysis is still necessary to explain why later-in-time reenactments of §§ 1325(a) and 
1326 do not deprive Article 31 of legal force. 
 197 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also Weinberger v. 
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (affirming this principle); Laurtizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) 
(same). Although Charming Betsy looked to customary international law as a guide to statutory 
interpretation, the Supreme Court has taken the same approach to treaties of the United States. See, e.g., 
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21–22 & n.12 (1963); Cook v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (citing Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 549 (1884)). 
 198 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003); Rebecca Crootof, Note, Judicious 
Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon, 120 YALE L.J. 1784, 1789 
(2011). 
 199 See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he purpose of the Charming 
Betsy canon is to avoid the negative ‘foreign policy implications’ of violating the law of nations.” (quoting 
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32)). 
 200 See Bradley, supra note 36, at 525 (describing Charming Betsy “as a means of both respecting 
the formal constitutional roles of Congress and the President and preserving a proper balance and 
harmonious working relationship among the three branches of the federal government”). 
 201 See, e.g., Cook, 288 U.S. at 120 (“A treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified 
by a later statute, unless such a purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.”); United 
States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that the Charming Betsy 
“presumption can be overcome only by a clear statement of intent to override international law”). 
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only for “some affirmative expression” in the statutory text or legislative 
history “of congressional intent to abrogate the United States’ international 
obligations.”202 All appear to agree, however, that courts should require at 
least some affirmative evidence of congressional intent before construing an 
ambiguous statute to violate international law.203 
The Charming Betsy canon applies with full force to §§ 1325(a) and 
1326.204 The text of these provisions does not specify unambiguously 
whether the prohibitions against illegal entry and reentry apply to refugees.205 
Nor does the relevant legislative history furnish any affirmative 
expression—much less a clear statement—that Congress intended to 
penalize refugees for irregular migration.206 Applying Charming Betsy to 
these provisions would also advance the canon’s core purpose—preventing 
the courts from generating friction with foreign governments and 
international organizations207—while also returning the sensitive question of 
immigration policy to Congress, where it belongs.208 Accordingly, 
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 are precisely the types of ambiguous statutory 
provisions that Charming Betsy serves to clarify.209 
The case for applying Charming Betsy to the INA is especially 
compelling, given Congress’s oft-expressed objective to harmonize federal 
immigration law with the United States’ obligations under international law. 
Congress adopted early versions of §§ 1325(a) and 1326 decades before 
policymakers enshrined special protections for refugees in domestic and 
 
 202 Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32. 
 203 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814–18 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
in part) (citing Charming Betsy and “recogniz[ing] the principle that the scope of generally worded 
statutes must be construed in light of international law”). 
 204 The fact that the Refugee Protocol is not self-executing under domestic law makes no difference 
in this analysis. Courts routinely use non-self-executing treaties to elucidate the meaning of ambiguous 
statutes. See, e.g., Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 782–83 (9th Cir. 2009); Hyundai Elecs. Co. v. United 
States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1343–44 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999). See generally Crootof, supra note 198, at 
1801–05 (discussing these and other cases). 
 205 See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining that Charming Betsy 
applies only if a statute “employ[s] ambiguous or ‘general’ words”). 
 206 See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. 
 207 See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) 
(emphasizing that the Charming Betsy canon prevents courts from causing “disturbance” and 
“embarrassment” to U.S. foreign relations). 
 208 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (“[T]hat the formulation of [immigration] policies 
is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial 
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.”). 
 209 See generally Khan, 584 F.3d at 783 (explaining that under Charming Betsy a court should 
“interpret the INA in such a way as to avoid any conflict with the [Refugee] Protocol, if possible”). 
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international law.210 When the United States joined the Refugee Protocol in 
1968, however, both the President and the Senate approved the treaty on the 
understanding that the INA’s criminal prohibitions against illegal entry and 
reentry were compatible with the Refugee Protocol.211 And when Congress 
revisited the United States’ obligations under international refugee law a 
decade later, it enacted the Refugee Act with the express purpose of 
eliminating any lingering incongruities between the INA and the Refugee 
Protocol.212 The historical record suggests, in other words, that for at least 
fifty years Congress has been committed to ensuring that federal immigration 
law satisfies the United States’ international obligations. Given this steadfast 
legislative commitment to international law compliance, courts have 
especially compelling reasons to apply the Charming Betsy canon in this 
context. 
In the past, the Executive Branch has endorsed the Charming Betsy 
canon’s guidance that INA provisions should be interpreted to avoid 
conflicts with Article 31. For example, in 1992, INS published a notice of 
proposed rulemaking detailing how it intended to implement a newly enacted 
INA section that authorized civil penalties for travel document fraud.213 
When a commentator expressed concern about the agency potentially 
penalizing refugees in violation of the United States’ obligations under the 
Refugee Protocol, INS Commissioner Gene McNary agreed that this 
objection was “well taken.”214 To address this concern, Commissioner 
McNary offered the following pledge: 
In order to avoid any conflict with the Convention, the Service will construe the 
document fraud penalties as inapplicable to a case in which the only 
presentation of the document was pursuant to direct departure from a country 
in which the alien has a well-founded fear of persecution or from which there 
is a significant danger that the alien would be returned to a country in which the 
alien would have a well-founded fear of persecution. The Service will not issue 
a Notice of Intent to Fine for any such act of document fraud committed by an 
alien prior to the opportunity to present himself or herself without delay to an 
 
 210 See text accompanying supra notes 49–74. 
 211 See text accompanying supra notes 84–88. 
 212 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the legislative 
history of . . . the entire [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United 
States refugee law into conformance with the [Protocol].”); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 
178 n.35, 179 (1993) (citing Charming Betsy and using the Protocol as a guide to the interpretation of 
domestic refugee law). 
 213 See Penalties for Document Fraud, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,862, 33,863 (July 31, 1992) (discussing 
regulations adopted to implement the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 544, 104 Stat. 
4978, 5059–61). 
 214 Id. at 33,866. 
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INS officer and to show good cause for his or her illegal entry or presence in 
accordance with Article 31(1) of the Convention.215 
Although McNary’s interpretation was not directed at §§ 1325(a) or 
1326 specifically, his assertion that the INA’s general penalty provisions 
should be interpreted to include implicit exceptions for refugees offers a 
model for how prosecutors and courts should construe §§ 1325(a) and 1326 
today. 
Defenders of refugee prosecution might raise at least two objections to 
this application of the Charming Betsy canon. First, they might argue that the 
Refugee Protocol entrusts the Attorney General with exclusive responsibility 
for determining how (or whether) the United States will comply with Article 
31.216 Perhaps the reason why the INA does not expressly exempt refugees 
from criminal liability is that members of Congress took for granted that, 
although refugees were technically liable for illegal entry and reentry, the 
DOJ would never actually bring those charges against them. This theory is 
plausible in the abstract, but mere plausibility is not enough to rebut the 
Charming Betsy canon. Instead, what is needed is actual evidence that 
Congress intended to empower federal prosecutors to violate the United 
States’ obligations under the Refugee Protocol. No such evidence appears in 
the INA’s text or its accompanying legislative history. Accordingly, mere 
speculation that Congress might have committed the task of international law 
compliance to federal prosecutors does not reflect the kind of “affirmative 
expression of congressional intent” that would displace the Charming Betsy 
canon’s rebuttable presumption.217 
Another possible objection is that the Charming Betsy canon does not 
categorically prohibit refugee prosecution, because not all refugees are 
within the compass of Article 31. There is some force to this argument. To 
enjoy immunity from criminal penalties under Article 31, refugees must 
“com[e] directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened,” 
“present themselves without delay to the authorities,” and “show good cause 
for their illegal entry or presence.”218 Accordingly, refugees lose their 
immunity from prosecution under Article 31 if they have received a firm 
offer of resettlement elsewhere or unreasonably delayed presenting 
 
 215 Id. Consistent with this interpretation, the INS adopted a rule excluding refugees from civil 
penalties under these circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 270.2(j) (2009). 
 216 Cf. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984) (suggesting that the United States was able to 
comply with the Refugee Protocol prior to the Refugee Act because “the Attorney General would honor 
the requirements of the Protocol” through the exercise of enforcement discretion). 
 217 Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982). 
 218 Refugee Protocol, supra note 17, art. 31(1). 
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themselves to authorities after crossing into the United States. This objection 
only goes so far, however, because it would not apply to the vast majority of 
refugees who have been prosecuted in the United States for immigration 
crimes, including Central Americans who have traveled through unsafe third 
countries where their lives and freedoms would be at risk.219 The Refugee 
Convention’s preparatory work confirms that refugees may still claim 
immunity from prosecution under Article 31 if the countries through which 
they traveled did not make firm offers of “protection or asylum” or 
“constituted actual or potential threats to [their] life or freedom.”220 These are 
precisely the factors that have driven refugees from Central America to 
undertake their perilous journeys to the United States. Thus, the 
overwhelming majority of refugees who attempt illegal entry or reentry into 
the United States are immune from criminal penalties under Article 31.221 
Significantly, the Refugee Convention and Protocol are not the only 
international treaties that support exempting refugees from criminal 
penalties.222 For instance, the United States is also a party to the 2004 
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air 
(Smuggling Protocol), which prohibits prosecuting migrants who use 
smugglers to enter the United States illegally.223 Further, refugee prosecution 
 
 219 For discussion of the risks Central American refugees face in transit states, see text accompanying 
infra notes 335–357. 
 220 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 80, ¶ 28. Significantly, refugees enjoy immunity from criminal 
penalties for illegal entry under Article 31(1) without any requirement to show that transit states would 
threaten their “life or freedom” on account of their race, religion, or another protected ground. Refugee 
Convention, supra note 12, art. 33(1). Instead, “the expression ‘coming directly’ in Article 31(1) covers 
the situation of a person who enters . . . from another country where his protection, safety and security 
could not be assured [for any reason] . . . [or] who transits an intermediate country for a short period of 
time without having applied for, or received, asylum there.” UNHCR, REVISED GUIDELINES ON 
APPLICABLE CRITERIA AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS ¶ 4 (1999). 
 221 On July 16, 2019, DOJ and DHS adopted an interim final rule that would disqualify migrants 
from receiving asylum if they “fail[ed] to apply for protection from persecution or torture while in a third 
country through which they transited en route to the United States.” See Asylum Eligibility and 
Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829, 33,829–30 (July 16, 2019). A challenge to the rule is 
currently pending in federal district court. See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974 
(N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 222 See CATHRYN COSTELLO, YULIA IOFFE & TERESA BÜCHSEL, ARTICLE 31 OF THE 1951 
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, PPLA/2017/01, at 8–10 (UNHCR Legal and 
Protection Policy Research Series 2017), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/59ad55c24.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/QW5M-FX7K] (discussing the sources in this paragraph). 
 223 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime art. 5, 2241 U.N.T.S. 507, entered into force 
Jan. 2004 (“Migrants shall not become liable to criminal prosecution . . . for the fact of having been the 
object of [illegal smuggling across borders].”). The United States ratified the treaty in 2005. See Protocol 
Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
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may also violate the United States’ obligations under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other human rights 
agreements.224 Human rights treaty bodies have expressed concern that 
criminalizing illegal entry “prevent[s] victims from seeking protection, 
assistance and justice”225 and therefore “exceeds the legitimate interests of 
States in protecting its territories and regulating irregular migration flows.”226 
Hence, in addition to violating the Refugee Protocol, the Trump 
Administration’s current zero-tolerance policy breaches other international 
obligations of the United States. 
Of course, had Congress specified clearly and unambiguously that it 
intended to punish refugees for illegal entry and reentry, courts could not use 
the Charming Betsy canon to frustrate that legislative purpose—even if 
Congress’s decision would violate the United States’ obligations under the 
Refugee Protocol, the Smuggling Protocol, and the ICCPR. But Congress 
has not placed courts in this position. Sections 1325(a) and 1326 do not 
expressly target refugees, and the legislative history of the INA and the 
Refugee Protocol indicate that members of Congress would have 
disapproved of refugee prosecution. Courts should therefore interpret 
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 narrowly to avoid violating the United States’ 
international commitments.227 
2. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
Constitutional concerns also preclude applying §§ 1325(a) and 1326 to 
refugees. In the past, critics of immigration prosecution have raised a host of 




 224 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 95-20 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes . . . to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as . . . national . . . origin . . . .”). 
 225 U.N. Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, Working Group on Trafficking in Persons, Non-Punishment and Non-Prosecution of 
Victims of Trafficking in Persons: Administrative and Judicial Approaches to Offences Committed in the 
Process of Such Trafficking, at 2–3, U.N. Doc CTOC/COP/WG.4/2010/4 (Dec. 9, 2009). 
 226 UNHRC, Rep. of the Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det. ¶ 58, A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 18, 2008), 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/102/94/PDF/G1010294.pdf?OpenElement 
[https://perma.cc/N5K7-ATCC]; see also OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., 
ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION OF MIGRANTS 13 (Migration Discussion Papers), 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/taskforce/docs/administrativedetentionrev5.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24K9-V7HF] (“[D]etention of migrants on the ground of their irregular status should 
under no circumstance be of a punitive nature.”). 
 227 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (concluding that the ICCPR “was not 
self-executing” but “does bind the United States as a matter of international law”). 
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judges have handled cases involving illegal entry and reentry charges. These 
objections have focused primarily on due process concerns related to 
Streamline proceedings. In particular, critics have argued that these 
proceedings give defendants insufficient time to prepare for expedited 
hearings, do not afford adequate access to translation services and legal 
counsel, and extract guilty pleas from large groups of defendants en masse.228 
What immigrant-rights advocates have overlooked is that refugee 
prosecution also violates another constitutional right: the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.229 Courts 
would do well, therefore, to interpret §§ 1325(a) and 1326 to avoid this 
possible constitutional infirmity. 
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man,” the Supreme Court has explained.230 “While the 
State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this 
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards,” as defined by 
“the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”231 
Applying these standards, the Court concluded in Trop v. Dulles that 
using expatriation—deprivation of citizenship and forced expulsion—as a 
criminal penalty would violate the Eighth Amendment.232 The problem with 
this practice was that it would effect “the total destruction of the individual’s 
status in organized society,” placing “[h]is very existence at the sufferance 
of the country in which he happens to find himself.”233 
While any one country may accord him some rights, . . . no country need do 
so because he is stateless. Furthermore, his enjoyment of even the limited rights 
of an alien might be subject to termination at any time by reason of deportation. 
In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights. 
This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the 
Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear 
 
 228 See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 666 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the 
indiscriminate shackling of defendants violated constitutional due process), vacated and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 1532 (2018) (concluding that the case was moot because the defendants had pleaded guilty); 
United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, 646 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that taking guilty pleas in 
large group hearings does not violate the Fifth Amendment); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 5 
(“The speed of the trial, lack of access to counsel, and insufficient efforts to overcome language barriers 
threaten the right to a fair trial and to effective counsel.”). 
 229 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 230 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 231 Id. at 100, 101. 
 232 Id. at 101–03. 
 233 Id. at 101. 
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and distress . . . . He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international 
community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous 
consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The 
threat makes the punishment obnoxious. 
The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that statelessness 
is not to be imposed as punishment for crime . . . . In this country the Eighth 
Amendment forbids that to be done.234 
Having “no choice but to enforce the paramount commands of the 
Constitution,” the Court declared in Trop that expatriation constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment.235 
Although refugees who face prosecution for entering the United States 
illegally do not face expatriation, threatening them with prosecution for 
illegal entry or reentry delivers a similarly devastating blow to their “status 
in organized society.”236 When refugees are outside their home countries 
without a realistic option to return, they are reduced to a status of de facto 
statelessness.237 Until refugees receive a firm offer of asylum elsewhere, 
punishing them for illegal entry sends the message that they are not welcome 
anywhere—that their human rights are at the mercy of domestic law 
enforcement agencies and may be disregarded by the agencies for any reason 
or no reason at all. If all states were to adopt this approach, refugees’ 
presence anywhere would constitute an unavoidable trespass.238 It would 
mean, in short, that refugees had “lost the right to have rights.”239 
Precisely for these reasons, the United States has joined with other 
members of the international community to condemn refugee prosecution as 
a cruel and inhumane practice. Article 31 of the Refugee Convention reflects 
a robust international consensus that penalizing refugees for illegal entry and 
 
 234 Id. at 101–03 (citations omitted). 
 235 Id. at 104. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan offered a decisive fifth vote in support of the 
Court’s holding that expatriation violates the Eighth Amendment. Without expressly rejecting the 
plurality’s focus on the Eighth Amendment’s “substantive limits,” Brennan proposed a different 
analytical framework for reaching the same conclusion. He asserted that expatriation was unconstitutional 
for the separate reason that it was disproportionate to Congress’s legitimate interest in deterring wartime 
desertion. Id. at 114 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 236 See id. at 101 (plurality opinion). 
 237 See 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78, 96 (1966). 
 238 See EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW INTERNATIONAL 
LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 267 (2016) (explaining how this concern underwrites the international 
prohibition against refoulement); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 279–80 (2009) (arguing that if all land were privately held and the landless were 
denied permission to be anywhere, “they would do wrong simply by being wherever they happened to 
be”). 
 239 Trop, 356 U.S. at 102. 
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reentry is inhumane.240 Both Congress and the Executive Branch have 
endorsed Article 31 in the past as a minimum standard of humane treatment 
for refugees,241 and the Supreme Court has stressed that international 
agreements like the Refugee Convention constitute important benchmarks 
for evaluating whether domestic practices satisfy the Eighth Amendment’s 
evolving standards of decency.242 Prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and 
reentry thus violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
To be sure, there is an important difference between expatriation (the 
practice addressed in Trop) and refugee prosecution: the former is a 
constitutionally impermissible method of punishment, while the latter 
exceeds the “substantive limits on what [conduct] can be made criminal and 
punished as such.”243 This distinction matters because the Supreme Court has 
advised that the Eighth Amendment’s substantive limits are “to be applied 
sparingly.”244 Courts rarely set aside criminal statutes on the ground that they 
overstep the Eighth Amendment’s substantive limits. Even so, a growing 
body of federal jurisprudence supports the conclusion that refugee 
prosecution violates the Eighth Amendment’s substantive limits. 
The conventional starting point for mapping the Eighth Amendment’s 
substantive limits is the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision Robinson v. 
California.245 At issue in Robinson was a California statute that declared it a 
crime to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”246 The Court observed that this 
formulation made the mere “‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, 
for which the offender may be prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms’”—
even if the offender had never “used or possessed any narcotics within the 
 
 240 At present, 149 states are parties to one or both of the Refugee Convention and Refugee Protocol. 
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-2&chapter=5&Temp=mt 
dsg2&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/ETM9-55E3]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-5& 
chapter=5 [https://perma.cc/59TR-8NMQ]. 
 241 See, e.g., Johnson Letter, supra note 85 (endorsing the Refugee Protocol); Senate Protocol Report, 
supra note 88 (same). 
 242 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80–82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577–
78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Trop, 356 U.S. at 102–03. See generally 
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1085, 1095–97, 1099–103 (2002) (discussing this principle). 
 243 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977). 
 244 Id. 
 245 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 246 Id. at 660 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
762 
State.”247 Recognizing that narcotics addiction is “an illness which may be 
contracted innocently or involuntarily,” the Court held that punishing a 
person based solely on their addictive impulses—without requiring any overt 
acts—would constitute cruel and unusual punishment.248 
A few years later, in Powell v. Texas,249 the Court evaluated a Texas 
statute that criminalized “get[ting] drunk or be[ing] found in a state of 
intoxication in any public place, or at any private house except his own.”250 
This time, the Justices divided over the proper application of the Eighth 
Amendment. In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
four Justices distinguished Robinson, asserting that the Texas statute could 
withstand constitutional scrutiny because it criminalized “public behavior,” 
not “mere status” or “an irresistible compulsion” that the defendant was 
“utterly unable to control.”251 A separate plurality of four Justices dissented 
on the grounds that the Texas statute reflected the same “essential 
constitutional defect” as the California statute in Robinson: both criminalized 
“a condition which [the offender] ha[s] no capacity to change or avoid.”252 
The decisive fifth vote in favor of the statute’s constitutionality came 
from Justice Byron White. Although White concurred in the result favored 
by Marshall, he disagreed with much of Marshall’s analysis. “If it cannot be 
a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics,” White reasoned, 
then it must also be unconstitutional for a state to make it “a crime to yield 
to such a compulsion.”253 Thus, White endorsed the Marshall plurality’s 
holding only on the more limited basis that the defendant could have taken 
steps to avoid “the act of going to or being in a public place” while 
inebriated.254 
Crucially, Justice White took pains to distinguish scenarios in which 
homeless defendants would have nowhere to consume alcohol other than in 
public. In White’s view, homeless alcoholics would have a valid 
constitutional defense to prosecution if they “have no place else to go and no 
place else to be when they are drinking.”255 Accordingly, if “resisting 
drunkenness is impossible” for some defendants due to their addiction, and 
if “avoiding public places when intoxicated is also impossible” due to the 
 
 247 Id. at 666. 
 248 Id. at 667. 
 249 392 U.S. 514 (1968). 
 250 Id. at 517 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE art. 477 (1952)). 
 251 Id. at 532, 535. 
 252 Id. at 567–68 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
 253 Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring). 
 254 Id. at 550 (emphasis added). 
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defendants’ homeless position, then the Texas statute would impermissibly 
target involuntary conduct in violation of the Eighth Amendment.256 
As foreshadowed by Justice White’s concurrence, lower federal courts 
have looked to Robinson and Powell for guidance when reviewing criminal 
laws that target the homeless.257 Consistent with Justice White’s view, most 
lower courts have held that a state cannot “expressly criminalize the status 
of homelessness by making it a crime to be homeless without violating the 
Eighth Amendment, nor can it criminalize acts that are an integral aspect of 
that status” (i.e., sleeping, lying, or eating in public spaces)258 unless it also 
furnishes spaces where the homeless can perform these basic life functions 
off the streets.259 “As long as the homeless . . . do not have a single place 
where they can lawfully be,” statutes that criminalize “sleeping, eating and 
other innocent conduct” “effectively punish them for something for which 
they may not be convicted under the [E]ighth [A]mendment.”260 
These cases offer important lessons for criminal laws that target 
refugees. As the Supreme Court has recognized, refugees are “the world’s 
homeless people.”261 Their homelessness is generated by factors beyond their 
personal control: individualized threats to their “life or freedom” in their 
country of origin.262 Moreover, these threats are based on aspects of refugees’ 
social status that are either outside their control or that the state may not 
legitimately require them to change—i.e., their “race, religion, nationality, 
 
 256 Id. 
 257 See Sara K. Rankin, Punishing Homelessness, 22 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 99 (2019) (discussing these 
developments); Hannah Kieschnick, Note, A Cruel and Unusual Way to Regulate the Homeless: 
Extending the Status Crimes Distinction to Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1569 (2018) 
(same). 
 258 Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 259 See, e.g., id. at 1132–36; Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 616 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he Eighth 
Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public 
property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (mem.); 
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (“As long as the homeless plaintiffs 
do not have a single place where they can lawfully be, the challenged ordinances . . . effectively punish 
them for something for which they may not be convicted under the [E]ighth [A]mendment—sleeping, 
eating and other innocent conduct.”). But see, e.g., Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994) (declining to apply the Eighth Amendment as a substantive limit on criminal laws that target 
the homeless based, in part, on the conclusion that homelessness is not a “status”). 
 260 Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1565. Under the Obama Administration, the DOJ supported this 
application of the Eighth Amendment. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Bell v. City of 
Boise, No. 1:09-cv-00540-REB (D. Idaho Aug. 6, 2015), ECF No. 276, https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/ 
761211/download [https://perma.cc/3DGS-DHN6] (asserting that when “sufficient shelter space is 
unavailable,” enforcing criminal ordinances against sleeping in public spaces “amounts to the 
criminalization of homelessness, in violation of the Eighth Amendment”). 
 261 Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 55 (1971). 
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membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”263 For a 
refugee, crossing an international border in pursuit of protection is therefore 
just as essential to her life and freedom as eating or sleeping in public is to a 
homeless person. In both contexts, criminal laws compel people, due to their 
vulnerable social status, to either accept unconscionable deprivations of their 
life or freedom (e.g., starvation, persecution) or commit otherwise innocent 
acts to escape those deprivations (e.g., eat in public, cross a border).264 As 
lower courts have held in homeless cases, the Eighth Amendment rescues 
people from this dilemma by invalidating laws like these that punish people 
for acts that are inextricably linked to their social status.265 Accordingly, to 
the extent that compliance with §§ 1325(a) and 1326 would prevent refugees 
from accessing refuge from persecution, penalties imposed under these 
provisions may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment. 
There are important limits to this Eighth Amendment defense. In 
homeless cases, courts have held that the Eighth Amendment does not 
prohibit municipalities from penalizing eating or sleeping in public if 
municipalities furnish dining halls and shelters where the homeless may 
perform these acts.266 It is only when municipalities do not offer these 
accommodations that defendants may invoke the Eighth Amendment 
successfully as a defense to prosecution under vagrancy laws. Following the 
logic of these decisions, refugees likely cannot invoke the Eighth 
Amendment as a defense to prosecution for illegal entry or reentry unless an 
illegal border crossing is the only option reasonably available to them to 
protect their life or freedom. To satisfy this burden, a refugee would have to 
show that illegal entry or reentry was necessary because she could not 
 
 263 Id.; accord Refugee Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(A)(2). 
 264 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1565 (observing that for the homeless “the lack of reasonable 
alternatives should not be mistaken for choice”). 
 265 See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 617 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[J]ust as the state may not 
criminalize the state of being ‘homeless in public places,’ the state may not ‘criminalize conduct that is 
an unavoidable consequence of being homeless—namely sitting, lying, or sleeping on the streets.’” 
(quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006))); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 
1565 (“As long as the homeless plaintiffs do not have a single place where they can lawfully be, the 
challenged ordinances, as applied to them, effectively punish them for something for which they may not 
be convicted under the [E]ighth [A]mendment—sleeping, eating and other innocent conduct.”). 
 266 See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying relief under the Eighth 
Amendment because Orlando’s “homeless shelter . . . has never reached its maximum capacity and . . . 
no individual has been turned away because there was no space available or for failure to pay the one 
dollar nightly fee”); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1167 (Cal. 1995) (rejecting an Eighth 
Amendment challenge on the ground that “it is far from clear that [the defendants] had alternatives to 
either the condition of being homeless or the conduct that led to homelessness and to the citations”). 
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reasonably obtain timely relief through an authorized port of entry.267 A 
refugee might also have to show that other countries through which she 
traveled en route to the United States would not guarantee her safety.268 For 
those who satisfy these requirements, however, imposing criminal penalties 
under §§ 1325(a) or 1326 would violate the Eighth Amendment. 
Some might question whether extending the Eighth Amendment to 
refugees in this manner stretches Robinson too far. Perhaps the Eighth 
Amendment’s substantive limits should prohibit only pure status crimes and 
crimes that target irresistible compulsions, not those that address acts like 
border crossings, which people perform deliberately, albeit under threat of 
grave harm.269 In my view, this is not the most faithful reading of Powell, 
given the limiting principles articulated in Justice White’s pivotal concurring 
opinion. Nor would this distinction be reasonable as applied to refugees, 
given that fleeing persecution is inextricably intertwined with refugee status. 
Yet, taking into consideration that none of the Justices who participated in 
Robinson and Powell remain on the Court today, it is impossible to rule out 
the possibility that the Court might eventually rein in the Eighth 
Amendment’s substantive limits in a way that would exclude refugees from 
constitutional protection. 
Despite these grounds for caution, the better view is that prosecuting 
refugees for illegal entry and reentry may, in fact, constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment. To uphold refugee prosecution, federal courts would 
have to take several audacious steps. First, they would have to disregard the 
fact that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry offends 
contemporary standards of decency enshrined in multilateral agreements to 
which the United States is a party, including the Refugee Protocol, the 
ICCPR, and the Smuggling Protocol. Second, they would have to reject the 
 
 267 This is not far-fetched. Between 2018 and 2020, DHS adopted measures that made it nearly 
impossible for refugees to obtain protection through ports of entry along the U.S.–Mexico border, thereby 
driving asylum-seekers to attempt hazardous crossings at unauthorized points along the border. I discuss 
these measures in Section III.B.1. Although not discussed in this Article, in recent months, U.S. ports of 
entry have essentially closed their doors to refugees in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. See Press 
Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., USCIS Preparing to Resume Public Services on June 4 (May 
27, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-preparing-resume-public-services-june-4 
[https://perma.cc/ABT3-K3LT] (noting “some domestic offices” will reopen but “offices will reduce the 
number of appointments and interviews”); Press Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., USCIS 
Temporary Office Closure Extended Until at Least May 3 (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/news/ 
alerts/uscis-temporary-office-closure-extended-until-least-may-3 [https://perma.cc/EB98-J9DG]. 
 268 In Section III.B.1, I explain why it is ordinarily unreasonable to expect asylum-seekers from 
Central America to pursue relief in transit states. 
 269 See Kieschnick, supra note 257, at 1579–91 (observing that a few lower courts have drawn these 
distinctions in domestic homelessness cases); cf. United States v. Cupa-Guillen, 34 F.3d 860, 862–63 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (declaring that illegal entry by a nonrefugee migrant “cannot be categorized as a status crime”). 
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conclusion endorsed by the Powell majority that individuals cannot 
constitutionally face punishment for acts compelled by forces beyond their 
control. Third, they would have to disavow Trop’s guidance regarding the 
unconstitutional cruelty of consigning people to statelessness. Although 
refugees are not “stateless” in a formal sense, the fact that they cannot return 
safely to their home countries means that they experience de facto 
statelessness—a similarly dire “fate of ever-increasing fear and distress” that 
is “deplored [by] the international community.”270 For all of these reasons, 
federal courts should hold that the Eighth Amendment does not permit courts 
to punish refugees—the world’s homeless people—for entering the United 
States to preserve their lives and basic freedoms.271 
Defenders of refugee prosecution might try to argue in the alternative 
that the Eighth Amendment does not limit Congress’s plenary power to 
regulate immigration,272 but this argument would have little merit. Although 
the Eighth Amendment does not constrain Congress’s power relative to the 
administrative detention and removal of foreign nationals,273 ordinary 
constitutional constraints apply whenever Congress imposes criminal 
sanctions on foreign migrants, including those related to illegal entry and 
reentry charges.274 Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment applies with full 
force to the criminal penalties associated with §§ 1325(a) and 1326. 
 
 270 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–02 (1958). 
 271 Skeptics might argue that the availability of relief at official ports of entry undermines these 
Eighth Amendment arguments. In Section III.A, I explain why the nominal availability of relief at ports 
of entry is inadequate to afford meaningful relief to many refugees—particularly in light of DHS’s recent 
efforts to prevent refugees from accessing U.S. soil through ports of entry. 
 272 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (“The power of Congress over the admission of 
aliens and their right to remain is necessarily very broad, touching as it does basic aspects of national 
sovereignty, more particularly our foreign relations and the national security.”); United States v. 
Hernandez-Guerrero, 147 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[A]t no time during the last century has any 
court questioned . . . Congress’s prerogative to enact criminal immigration laws.”). 
 273 See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 924 F.3d 164, 170 (5th Cir. 2019) (rejecting 
defendants’ Eighth Amendment claims because “they ha[d] not shown that deportation was caused by 
their § 1325(a) convictions”); Bassett v. INS, 581 F.2d 1385, 1388 (10th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he non-penal 
nature of Congress’ plenary power to enumerate and enforce deportable offenses does not permit us to 
use the Eighth Amendment as a basis for setting aside the deportation order.”); Calderon-Rodriguez v. 
Wilcox, 347 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1037–38 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does 
not apply to immigration detention). See generally Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) 
(“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a 
criminal procedure.”). 
 274 See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–39 (1987) (holding that constitutional 
due process applies to prosecutions under § 1326); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 
(1896) (holding that when Congress “declare[s] unlawful residence within the country to be an infamous 
crime,” ordinary constitutional constraints on criminal punishment apply). 
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Should courts prefer to sidestep these delicate constitutional questions, 
the canon of constitutional avoidance offers a possible alternative solution.275 
Rather than resolve the Eighth Amendment issue on the merits, courts could 
instead construe §§ 1325(a) and 1326 to avoid this problem by holding that 
the provisions do not apply to refugees. Given that refugee prosecution so 
clearly offends contemporary standards of decency, as reflected in the 
Refugee Protocol, courts would do well to avoid attributing this meaning to 
the INA’s ambiguous text in the absence of a crystal-clear directive from 
Congress.276 Thus, whether applied directly on the merits or indirectly via the 
canon of constitutional avoidance, the Eighth Amendment bolsters the 
conclusion that the federal government may not prosecute refugees for illegal 
entry or reentry. 
3. The Rule of Lenity 
The rule of lenity further confirms that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 do not 
apply to refugees. Under the rule of lenity, courts must interpret ambiguous 
criminal statutes “in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”277 When a 
criminal statute can sustain more than one interpretation after courts have 
exhausted other traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the rule of lenity 
directs courts to choose the narrower interpretation.278 Thus, if “reasonable 
doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to ‘the 
language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the 
statute,” the proper course is to decide the interpretive question in the 
defendant’s favor.279 
 
 275 See United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (“A statute must be construed, if 
fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon 
that score.”). See generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (applying the canon of constitutional 
avoidance to another provision of the INA); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (observing that the canon on constitutional avoidance “has for 
so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate”). But see Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. 
Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 
2163 (2015) (arguing that courts should eschew constitutional avoidance when they “articulate new 
constitutional norms”). 
 276 Cf. United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916) (avoiding grave constitutional 
questions through interpretation). 
 277 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008). 
 278 See United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952) (“[W]hen choice 
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before 
we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear 
and definite.”). 
 279 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 
381, 387 (1980)); see also Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 224 (applying lenity to a case where 
“the history of [a statute] and the inexplicitness of its language” did not render its meaning “decisively 
clear on its face one way or the other”). 
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The rule of lenity serves several purposes in American criminal law.280 
First, it safeguards legislative supremacy and promotes legislative 
accountability by ensuring that Congress takes responsibility for defining 
federal crimes.281 Second, it promotes the rule of law by confirming that 
federal statutes give the public adequate notice about what conduct is 
criminal.282 Third, it constrains prosecutorial discretion to “minimize the risk 
of selective or arbitrary enforcement.”283 
The Supreme Court has also applied the rule of lenity outside the 
criminal context when interpreting federal immigration law. Recognizing 
that “the stakes are considerable for” foreign nationals in removal 
proceedings, the Supreme Court has cautioned that the Executive and 
Judicial Branches must “not assume that Congress meant to trench on [a 
foreign national’s] freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest 
of several possible meanings of the words used.”284 According to the Court, 
lenity is warranted in these contexts based, at least in part, on the fact that 
noncitizens “cannot vote” in federal elections and therefore are “particularly 
vulnerable to adverse legislation.”285 Thus, in addition to the concerns about 
legislative supremacy, notice, and arbitrary enforcement, the fact that foreign 
 
 280 See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). 
 281 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal 
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, 
legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 
(5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“[The rule of lenity] is founded on . . . the plain principle that the power of 
punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, 
which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.”). See generally Price, supra note 44, at 887 
(emphasizing the role of lenity in “advancing the democratic accountability of criminal justice”). 
 282 See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (“Although it is not likely that a criminal 
will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning 
should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends 
to do if a certain line is passed.”). 
 283 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952. 
 284 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) 
(underscoring “the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes 
in favor of the alien” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987))). The Court has 
indicated, in particular, that the rule of lenity applies to provisions of the INA that govern eligibility for 
asylum and other forms of relief from removal. See, e.g., id. at 321; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449; 
INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966). 
 285 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315 & n.39 (paraphrasing with approval the argument in Stephen H. 
Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. 
L. REV. 1615, 1626 (2000)); see also Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and 
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1293 (2002) (drawing links between 
this rationale and the Supreme Court’s theory advanced in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 
304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (explaining that legislative targeting of “discrete and insular 
minorities . . . may call for a . . . more searching judicial inquiry”)); Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration 
Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 552, 552 n.34 (2003) (same). 
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nationals are a politically disenfranchised “discrete and insular minority” 
offers an important justification for applying the rule of lenity to ambiguous 
statutes that target foreigners for special criminal sanctions.286 
Applying the rule of lenity to §§ 1325(a) and 1326 makes good sense, 
given the many compelling reasons courts have to doubt whether refugee 
prosecution would comport with Congress’s legislative plan. Although 
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 do not expressly mention refugees, the broader text, 
purpose, and legislative history of the INA indicate that Congress did not 
envision—and would not have approved—applying these provisions to 
refugees. Considered alongside the Charming Betsy canon and the canon of 
constitutional avoidance, these factors are amply sufficient to generate 
“reasonable doubt” as to whether prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and 
reentry would be compatible with Congress’s statutory plan for immigration 
and border control. Accordingly, the rule of lenity dictates that any residual 
ambiguity in §§ 1325(a) and 1326 must be resolved in favor of refugee 
defendants. 
C. Synthesis and Recommendations 
In sum, this Part has shown that the current conventional wisdom about 
refugee prosecution is wrong: the INA does not expose refugees to criminal 
penalties for illegal entry and reentry. Although § 1325(a) is cast in 
seemingly absolute terms, the full text, purpose, and legislative history of the 
INA strongly suggest that this provision does not apply to refugees. The case 
for refugee immunity is even stronger under § 1326, which expressly 
exempts those who are “not required to obtain [the Attorney General’s] 
advance consent” to admission—a category that arguably includes 
refugees.287 In addition, three well-established principles of federal statutory 
interpretation—the Charming Betsy canon, the canon on constitutional 
avoidance, and the rule of lenity—lend powerful support for interpreting 
both sections to exclude refugees from criminal liability. Courts would do 
well, therefore, to recognize that refugees are not subject to criminal 
penalties for illegal entry or reentry. 
This conclusion has sweeping implications for American criminal 
justice.288 In particular, it suggests that DHS should abandon its recent 
 
 286 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 
‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 287 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 
 288 In the paragraphs that follow, I endorse several recommendations from Human Rights First’s 
excellent January 2018 report, Punishing Refugees and Migrants: The Trump Administration’s Misuse of 
Criminal Prosecutions. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
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practice of referring asylum-seekers for criminal prosecution immediately 
following their apprehension. Instead, DHS should restore its time-honored 
practice of referring asylum-seekers for credible fear interviews before 
asylum officers, thereby enabling refugees to seek relief in immigration court 
first. Federal prosecutors, in turn, should refrain from bringing criminal 
charges until after an asylum officer or immigration judge has made a final 
determination that an asylum-seeker does not qualify as a genuine refugee. 
If the Executive Branch refuses to abandon its zero-tolerance policy, federal 
courts should confirm that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 do not apply to refugees and 
require prosecutors to allow asylum-seekers to petition for relief through the 
immigration process before initiating criminal charges. 
Sequencing immigration proceedings before criminal trials in this 
manner is essential to protect refugees from unwarranted convictions and 
due process violations.289 Federal courts are poorly equipped to make refugee 
status determinations by virtue of their distinctive procedures. This is 
obviously true for Streamline proceedings that combine a defendant’s initial 
appearance, arraignment, plea, and sentencing in a single expedited hearing 
before a magistrate judge.290 These expedited proceedings are not designed 
to handle the fact-intensive inquiries that arise in refugee status 
determinations, which often entail significant witness testimony and 
documentary evidence. Moreover, it is no less true for ordinary criminal 
cases before federal district judges. Because refugees usually have limited 
access to evidence other than their own personal testimony, most are forced 
to rely on hearsay statements that would be admissible in immigration 
court291 but not in a federal district court.292 Requiring asylum-seekers to 
establish the factual basis for their refugee status in federal district court 
would therefore deprive many refugees of a full and fair opportunity to 
 
 289 See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 80, ¶ 4 (“In most cases, only if an individual’s claim to refugee 
status is examined before he or she is affected by an exercise of State jurisdiction (for example, in regard 
to penalization for ‘illegal’ entry), can the State be sure that its international obligations are met.”). 
 290 See Sklansky, supra note 64, at 169–70. 
 291 See In re Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 188 (B.I.A. 1984) (“It is well established that the strict 
rules of evidence are not applicable in deportation proceedings.”). 
 292 See FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: 
a federal statute; these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”); UNHCR, HANDBOOK 
AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶ 197 (2d ed. 1992, 
2011 reissue), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html [https://perma.cc/24QQ-272E] (“The 
requirement of evidence should . . . not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent 
in the special situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself.”); Puhl, supra note 126, at 
103 (observing that applying the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings “eliminates a large portion of 
evidence that is used to prove asylum cases, which frequently rely only on hearsay testimony by the 
asylum seeker herself”). 
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mount an effective defense to prosecution, in violation of their constitutional 
right to due process and the United States’ international obligations.293 Due 
process concerns dictate, therefore, that DHS must allow asylum-seekers to 
establish their refugee status in immigration court before DOJ pursues 
criminal charges based on illegal entry or reentry.294 
Allowing immigration proceedings to conclude before prosecutors 
bring criminal charges is also necessary to respect Congress’s statutory plan 
for refugee status determinations. The INA entrusts refugee status 
determinations to immigration courts, not federal district courts, in the first 
instance.295 The best way to respect this legislative choice, while preserving 
asylum-seekers’ right to invoke their refugee status as a defense to criminal 
liability, is for prosecutors to wait to decide whether to bring charges under 
§§ 1325(a) and 1326 until after an asylum officer or immigration judge has 
determined whether foreign migrants are bona fide refugees. 
Once prosecutors and courts recognize that refugees are not criminally 
liable for illegal entry and reentry, they will have to work through the 
implications of this conclusion for pending cases and past convictions. 
Refugees with convictions that are still pending should be able to invoke 
their actual innocence as a defense on appeal.296 Whether courts may 
entertain requests to vacate convictions that have already become final is less 
 
 293 See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837 (1987) (holding that constitutional due 
process applies to prosecutions under § 1326); United States v. Reyes-Bonilla, 671 F.3d 1036, 1042–43 
(9th Cir. 2012) (same). 
 294 A refugee should not be precluded from collaterally challenging a negative status determination 
reached in immigration court, however, if “(1) [she has] exhausted any administrative remedies that may 
have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the [removal] proceedings . . . improperly deprived 
[her] of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” 
8 U.S.C. § 1326(d); see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S at 839 (“Depriving an alien of the right to have the 
disposition in a deportation hearing reviewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, that review be 
made available in any subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation proceeding is used to 
establish an element of a criminal offense.”). 
 295 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (“Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this 
section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the 
United States . . . .”); see also United States v. Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1988) (“A 
criminal trial for the felony of illegal reentry . . . is not the proper forum to argue a case for political 
asylum.”). Further evidence of Congress’s expectation that immigration proceedings would precede 
criminal proceedings can be found in § 1326 itself, which limits the circumstances under which criminal 
defendants may use criminal proceedings to challenge the validity of a deportation order. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1326(d). 
 296 Cf. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding “that a new rule for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases . . . pending on direct review or not yet 
final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”). 
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clear but merits further study.297 It might well be an abuse of discretion for 
the Attorney General to rely on past convictions under §§ 1325(a) and 1326 
as grounds for denying refugees’ petitions for asylum or other discretionary 
relief. Although this Article does not afford the space necessary to sort 
through all of these complexities, the scope of the challenge ahead 
underscores the need for an expeditious course correction. 
III. IS PROSECUTING REFUGEES MORALLY DEFENSIBLE? 
This Part bolsters the case against prosecuting refugees by explaining 
why the international community, members of Congress, and (until recently) 
federal prosecutors have rejected the practice as immoral. Advocates of 
restrictive immigration policies might find this idea counterintuitive. What 
is so wrong, some might ask, with using criminal penalties to establish an 
orderly process for admitting refugees and screening out other irregular 
migrants? Doesn’t the United States have a legitimate sovereign interest in 
securing its borders and enforcing its law? 
In this Part, I argue that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and illegal 
reentry may be unconscionable for several reasons. First, prosecution is 
immoral when a refugee’s decision to obviate U.S. border controls is 
objectively justified based on her well-founded fear of persecution abroad. 
Second, even if violating U.S. border controls is not objectively justified, an 
illegal entry may be morally excused based on a refugee’s subjective fear of 
mistreatment or other individualized factors. Third, the United States’ 
current approach to prosecuting refugees is inconsistent with the rule of law 
as a moral ideal. Fourth, the way that the United States handles criminal 
cases at the U.S.–Mexico border is morally indefensible because it often 
prevents refugees from accessing asylum and withholding of removal, 
thereby exposing refugees to persecution abroad. Thus, the factors that 
support refugee prosecution are manifestly outweighed by countervailing 
moral considerations. 
To be clear, I do not argue here that the United States could never 
morally prosecute refugees for violating domestic border controls under any 
circumstances. My claim is narrower—namely, that the United States’ recent 
approach to refugee prosecution is morally indefensible.298 By preventing all 
 
 297 See Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 
925 (2006) (“Under current law, no serious problems are posed by cases in which a defendant’s conviction 
has become ‘final’ before the law-changing decision was announced . . . .”); cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, 87–89 (1977) (establishing a “contemporaneous-objection rule” to limit federal habeas 
review for issues that defendants failed to raise in state criminal proceedings). 
 298 As noted previously, this Part does not address the unique moral considerations and domestic 
regulatory responses associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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but a tiny fraction of refugees from accessing relief through legal channels, 
the United States has undermined its moral authority to prosecute asylum-
seekers who enter without inspection. The United States cannot have it both 
ways; it cannot in good conscience prevent refugees from accessing its 
territory through official ports of entry while simultaneously prosecuting 
those who enter elsewhere. This moral assessment has important legal 
consequences, because it strengthens the case for concluding that refugees 
have valid defenses to prosecution under the Eighth Amendment and federal 
common law.299 
A few additional provisos are necessary at the outset. For purposes of 
the present discussion, I assume that states have morally compelling reasons 
to regulate migration across their borders through civil and administrative 
law, including for the purpose of safeguarding their national security.300 I also 
assume arguendo that the United States’ criminal prohibitions on illegal 
entry and reentry are necessary to punish and deter unauthorized immigration 
by nonrefugee migrants.301 Yet, even if both of these assumptions hold true, 
it still does not follow that the federal government can morally prosecute 
refugees who enter U.S. territory without inspection. As long as the United 
States prevents needy refugees from accessing protection through legally 
prescribed channels, it is immoral for the federal government to punish 
refugees who pursue refuge in the United States through irregular 
channels.302 
A. The Conventional Case for Prosecution 
Although the Executive Branch has not offered a robust moral 
justification for refugee prosecution, its reasons for embracing this policy 
can be deduced from a patchwork of sources, including CBP’s response to 
the DHS Inspector General’s report and arguments that federal prosecutors 
have advanced in criminal cases. The primary rationale appears to be that 
prosecution is necessary to establish an orderly and efficient process for 
 
 299 In particular, this Part reinforces the conclusion that refugee prosecution violates the Eighth 
Amendment, see supra Section II.C, and that refugees may present successful necessity and duress 
defenses to criminal liability, see infra Section III.D. 
 300 Accordingly, this Part does not address the morality of civil and administrative enforcement 
measures, such as deportation. 
 301 For a general introduction to the legal and policy issues surrounding border criminalization, see 
Eagly, supra note 62. 
 302 This Part does not address whether the United States may morally prosecute forced migrants who 
do not qualify as “refugees” under international and domestic law—including those displaced by civil 
unrest, famine, and environmental catastrophe. I hope to take up this question in future work. 
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admitting bona fide refugees while screening out asylum-seekers with 
baseless claims.303 
This argument is plausible enough on its face. Every sovereign state has 
a legitimate interest in protecting its national security and conserving its 
limited administrative resources. To this end, criminalizing illegal entry and 
reentry demarcates a clear “baseline of desired conduct” that the United 
States can use to channel asylum-seekers into orderly screening processes.304 
For example, refugees may apply for the United States’ overseas refugee 
resettlement program305 or request permission to travel to the United States 
through an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa program.306 Those who reach the 
United States’ territorial borders may apply for relief at official ports of 
entry.307 Using criminal law to incentivize participation in these orderly 
screening processes should enable the federal government to screen out 
asylum-seekers who are not refugees, as well as refugees who do not qualify 
for admission because they would endanger U.S. national security.308 An 
orderly admissions process could also empower DHS and DOJ to conserve 
administrative resources by concentrating asylum officers and immigration 
judges at designated ports of entry, freeing Border Patrol agents to focus their 
attention on apprehending and removing other foreign nationals who attempt 
to enter U.S. territory without authorization. Without question, these are 
significant governmental interests. 
 
 303 See INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 31–32 (stressing the need for orderly processing of 
criminal and administrative matters); Jessica Zhang & Andrew Patterson, The Most Prosecuted Federal 
Offense in America: A Primer on the Criminalization of Border Crossing, LAWFARE (July 25, 2019, 8:41 
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/most-prosecuted-federal-offense-america-primer-criminalization-
border-crossing [https://perma.cc/BR68-VJMV] (“Opponents of decriminalization . . . [emphasize] the 
meaning of sovereignty, international borders and the rule of law.”). 
 304 Juliette Kayyem, Decriminalizing the Border Is Not in Anyone’s Interest, WASH. POST (July 2, 
2019, 12:04 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/decriminalizing-the-border-is-not-in-
anyones-interest/2019/07/01/27292360-9c36-11e9-85d6-5211733f92c7_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
T6C7-8ZDY]. 
 305 See U.S. Refugee Admissions Program: Overseas Application and Case Processing, U.S. DEP’T 
OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, & MIGRATION, https://www.state.gov/refugee-
admissions/application-and-case-processing/ [https://perma.cc/Z677-WVND] (discussing overseas 
refugee resettlement). 
 306 See U.S. Visas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFS., 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas.html [https://perma.cc/BJ7G-XR7Y] (offering an 
overview of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa programs). 
 307 See INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 32 (defending illegal reentry prosecution on the 
ground that a refugee “always has the option of presenting themselves at the port of entry to make their 
claim”). 
 308 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (permitting U.S. officials to exclude or deport refugees who have 
engaged in persecution, committed certain serious crimes, or otherwise pose “a danger to the security of 
the United States”). 
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B. Exculpating Factors 
Notwithstanding these facially reasonable grounds for prosecuting 
refugees for illegal entry and reentry, there are a variety of important reasons 
why the threats that refugees face in their home countries should exculpate 
them from criminal liability. For ease of analysis, these exculpating 
considerations can be divided into two categories: justifications and excuses. 
These exculpating considerations clarify why U.S. lawmakers would exempt 
refugees from criminal penalties for illegal entry and reentry in the Refugee 
Protocol and the INA. As will become apparent later in this Part, these 
considerations also suggest that courts should allow refugees to raise 
common law defenses to prosecution under §§ 1325(a) and 1326.309 
1. Justifications 
In the moral philosophy of criminal law, justifications involve 
situations where a person’s actions are morally warranted, despite the fact 
that they violate positive law. A legal violation is justified in this sense if it 
is morally appropriate, all things considered.310 Justifications focus on the 
moral propriety of acts as such, not the volition or intentions of particular 
actors. 
Legal theorists have offered competing philosophical theories to 
explain why criminal acts may be morally justified in this sense. 
Retributivists consider an act justified if legal sanctions would be 
“undeserved,” taking into account all relevant moral considerations.311 In 
contrast, utilitarians consider an act justified if it produces “consequences 
that are, on balance, socially desirable.”312 Under both theories, the fact that 
an act violates positive law may be an important factor weighing against the 
conclusion that it is morally justified, but an unlawful act may nonetheless 
be justified if it is supported by substantial, countervailing moral 
considerations. 
 
 309 See infra Section III.D. 
 310 Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 
89–91 (1986). 
 311 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 943 (1978) (“An inference from the 
wrongful act to the actor’s character is essential to a retributive theory of punishment.”); JOHN GARDNER, 
In Defence of Defences, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 77, 77 (2007) (asserting that both utilitarians and retributivists, such as Immanuel Kant, 
accept that the idea that an act is not “wrong unless it is wrong all things considered, i.e., taking into 
account of both the reasons in favour of performing it (the pros) and the reasons against performing it 
(the cons)”); Kent Greenawalt, “Uncontrollable” Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Implications of 
Powell v. Texas, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 953 (1969) (observing that for retributivists, punishment is 
wrong if “undeserved”). 
 312 Greenawalt, supra note 311, at 938. 
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A classic example of a justified crime is a hiker who, having lost her 
way in the wilderness, steals food from an uninhabited cabin to ward off 
starvation.313 Although the hiker commits a crime by stealing food, few 
would dispute that her act is justified under the circumstances. Retributivists 
would consider punishment undeserved in this scenario because the law 
could not reasonably fault the starving hiker for taking prudent steps to 
preserve life. Likewise, utilitarians would accept that the hiker’s decision to 
steal food, rather than perish from starvation, achieves the best overall 
outcome for society.314 Accordingly, courts and legal scholars have accepted 
without controversy that the starving hiker’s criminal act is justified—and, 
therefore, exculpated—in light of her exigent circumstances.315 
The same logic of moral justification is implicit in Article 31 of the 
Refugee Convention. Article 31 was designed to prevent states–parties from 
placing refugees in the untenable position of having to choose between 
persecution in their home countries and criminal sanctions in countries where 
they seek asylum.316 By prohibiting states from prosecuting refugees for 
ordinary immigration crimes, the Refugee Convention recognizes that 
refugees have sound moral justifications for violating domestic immigration 
controls. This is obviously true from a retributivist perspective, because a 
state cannot reasonably blame a refugee for crossing its borders illegally 
when this step is necessary to prevent death, torture, or other serious harm. 
It is no less true when viewed from a utilitarian perspective—violating U.S. 
border controls is clearly the lesser evil when compared with the serious 
threats that await refugees abroad. Moreover, the utilitarian argument for 
refugee prosecution is particularly weak given that DHS itself recognizes 
that the threat of criminal sanctions does not actually deter refugees from 
attempting illegal entry and reentry.317 
Some might object that prosecuting refugees could advance social 
welfare by deterring immigration crimes by nonrefugee migrants. This 
conjecture is suspect, to say the least. Opponents of the criminalization of 
immigration enforcement contend that there is no reliable evidence that 
 
 313 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1205–06, 1229 (1985). 
 314 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories of Justification, 76 N.C. 
L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1998). 
 315 See, e.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991); Robinson & Darley, supra 
note 314, at 1097; Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 258 (1987). 
 316 See WEIS, supra note 83, art. 31, ¶¶ 1–4, at 201–03 (discussing this principle). 
 317 See DHS STATISTICS, supra note 10, at 16 (describing asylum-seekers as “‘non-impactable’ by 
traditional enforcement policies”). 
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criminal penalties deter migrants from entering the United States,318 let alone 
that refugee prosecution influences whether nonrefugee migrants do so. But 
even if refugee prosecution has some general deterrent effect on nonrefugee 
migrants, its marginal contribution is likely exceedingly small. There simply 
is no good reason to think that prosecuting refugees makes such a significant 
contribution to general deterrence that it would outweigh the countervailing 
social costs of refugee prosecution and incarceration. 
More fundamentally, the general deterrence argument for refugee 
protection overlooks the salience of blameworthiness in moral justification. 
Criminal law theorists of all stripes tend to agree that public authorities must 
not punish a person whose conduct is otherwise blameless solely for the 
purpose of deterring others.319 Although utilitarians do not accept the 
retributivist thesis that blameworthiness is a sufficient condition for criminal 
liability, most agree that it is a necessary condition for legitimate criminal 
penalties.320 If this conventional wisdom is correct, and if I am right that 
refugees are morally blameless for committing immigration crimes in order 
to access relief from persecution, then the general deterrence argument for 
refugee prosecution collapses, as the necessary condition of 
blameworthiness is absent. 
A more serious argument against regarding refugee status as a moral 
justification for illegal entry or reentry is that irregular migration into the 
United States might not be strictly necessary to avoid the threat of 
persecution abroad. If a refugee could indeed avoid persecution without 
violating U.S. immigration controls, then it would be much harder to argue 
that her illegal entry or reentry was a morally appropriate action, all things 
considered. In particular, defenders of refugee prosecution might object that 
unauthorized border crossings are not strictly necessary to secure protection 
in the United States for two reasons: (1) refugees can access protection in the 
United States without committing immigration crimes, and (2) refugees can 
access protection in other countries without entering the United States. 
Neither of the arguments can withstand close scrutiny because they are 
based on mistaken assumptions about refugees’ options. In the real world, 
refugees who enter the United States outside an official port of entry 
 
 318 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 26–27 (observing that some federal agencies have 
called into question whether prosecuting unauthorized migrants for illegal entry and reentry moves the 
needle on deterring unauthorized migration); Keller, supra note 110, at 137 (concluding that “there is 
simply no evidence that the government is meaningfully deterring illegal immigration by prosecuting 
illegal entry and re-entry cases”). 
 319 See Greenawalt, supra note 311, at 939–40. 
 320 See id. 
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typically do so only as a last resort, having no other realistic options for 
obtaining a safe refuge from persecution. 
Consider first the argument that refugees can access protection in the 
United States without committing immigration crimes. While it is true that 
the United States does offer protection to some refugees through ordinary 
admissions processes, for the vast majority of refugees around the world 
these avenues for relief are chimerical. Only a tiny percentage of the twenty-
six million refugees worldwide receive offers to resettle outside their home 
countries.321 In the period since President Trump took office in January 2017 
through September 2019, the United States admitted approximately 76,200 
refugees through its overseas refugee resettlement program,322 and the 
administration has announced plans to cut admissions even further to a 
maximum of 18,000 in 2020.323 Typically, refugees who are not accepted into 
the overseas refugee resettlement program have no other lawful avenue to 
access refuge in the United States. Most can reach an official U.S. port of 
entry only by air or sea, but they cannot board a commercial airplane or ship 
bound for the United States without a passport and visa.324 Due to the perilous 
circumstances that drive their flight, refugees often lack passports from their 
home country.325 To make matters worse, Congress has not established an 
immigrant visa program for refugees, and the State Department routinely 
denies temporary visitor visas to foreign nationals who reveal that they are 
seeking refuge from persecution.326 Hence, even when refugees have time 
 
 321 In 2019, only 107,800 out of twenty-six million refugees were resettled. Figures at a Glance, 
UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/J67E-2GAL]. 
 322 Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/13/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6AU4-MA9X]. 
 323 See Michael D. Shear & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Trump Slashes Refugee Cap to 18,000, Curtailing 
U.S. Role as Haven, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/26/us/ 
politics/trump-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/A3GQ-3XM2]. 
 324 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 273.1–6 (2020) (specifying the procedures carriers must employ to screen 
passengers, promulgated under 8 U.S.C. § 1323 (specifying that it is unlawful for any carrier to bring to 
the United States any alien who does not have authorization to enter the United States)). 
 325 See Rosemary Byrne & Andrew Shacknove, The Safe Country Notion in European Asylum Law, 
9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 189 (1996) (“The purpose of Article 31 is to recognize in international law 
that refugees, owing to their hostile relations with their own governments, may be unable to obtain normal 
immigration documents and may resort to extra-legal measures in order to flee persecution and seek 
asylum.”). 
 326 See DAVID A. MARTIN, T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, HIROSHI MOTOMURA & MARYELLEN 
FULLERTON, FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 593 (1st ed. 2007) (noting that “the refugee 
definition is not a basis for receiving a U.S. visa” and that “U.S. law bars the issuance of a nonimmigrant 
visa in the most widely used categories . . . if there are indications that the person intends, for any reason 
to abandon his or her foreign residence” (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 
§ 101(a)(15)(B), (F), 66 Stat. 163, 167–68 (1952))). 
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and resources to apply for visas, their chances of success are vanishingly 
slim. Cumulatively, these legal and practical constraints prevent the vast 
majority of refugees from accessing protection through the United States’ 
orderly admissions process. Most refugees therefore have no way to access 
refuge in the United States other than to attempt an unlawful entry, 
sometimes with the aid of fraudulent documents.327 
The obstacles that await refugees who reach the United States’ borders 
are different, but scarcely less daunting. Asylum-seekers who arrive at a U.S. 
border are legally entitled to enter and receive refuge in the United States.328 
In practice, however, the manner in which DHS regulates the U.S.–Mexico 
border belies its ostensible aspiration to establish an orderly and humane 
admissions process for refugees. 
Within the past two years, DHS has established a “Remain in Mexico” 
program that physically excludes asylum-seekers from U.S. territory while 
they await a final adjudication of their petitions for asylum and withholding 
of removal.329 Remain in Mexico has two central features. First, pursuant to 
DHS’s “metering” rules, CBP officers turn back arriving asylum-seekers 
before they reach the U.S. border330 to wait—for weeks, if not months—for 
an interview where they can request refuge.331 Second, if asylum-seekers 
 
 327 See Wu Zheng Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]f illegal manner of flight . . . 
were enough independently to support a denial of asylum . . . virtually no persecuted refugee would obtain 
asylum.”); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 80, at 5 (observing that “[a] refugee whose departure from his 
country of origin is usually a flight, is rarely in a position to comply with the requirements for legal entry” 
(quoting the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems)). 
 328 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (“Any alien . . . who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a 
designated port of arrival . . .), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum . . . .”); id. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (providing that a foreign national “arriving in the United States” must be referred to 
an asylum officer for an interview if “the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a 
fear of persecution”). 
 329 See generally HILLEL R. SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10295, THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY’S REPORTED “METERING” POLICY: LEGAL ISSUES (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/LSB10295.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZJ7-DCRE] (discussing the policy). 
This followed a presidential proclamation that suspended all admissions at the U.S.–Mexico border for 
ninety days. See Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,881 (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-addressing-mass-migration-
southern-border-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/R7RC-XYCR] (President Trump’s Proclamation 
Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of the United States). 
 330 See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Partially Dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint at 6–11, Al Otro Lado v. Nielsen, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. Nov. 
29, 2018) (arguing that repulsing asylum-seekers from the United States pursuant to the “Remain in 
Mexico” policy is lawful because they lack constitutional and statutory rights under U.S. law as they have 
not reached U.S. territory). 
 331 SMITH, supra note 329, at 3. To the consternation of refugee-rights activists, the Trump 
Administration has authorized Border Patrol agents to conduct credible fear interviews in some locations, 
sidelining asylum officers. See Molly O’Toole, Border Patrol Agents, Rather than Asylum Officers, 
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successfully demonstrate a credible fear of persecution during their initial 
interview, the so-called “Migration Protection Protocols” (MPP) 
ordinarily332 require that they continue to wait in Mexico until the time 
arrives for their appearance before an immigration judge.333 Even if 
immigration judges determine that refugees qualify for asylum or 
withholding of removal, DHS may still exclude them until DOJ’s Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) completes appellate review.334 All told, this 
process can result in refugees being excluded from U.S. territory for years as 
their immigration cases run their course. 
DHS has described Remain in Mexico as a “humanitarian” solution to 
an immigration crisis that has overwhelmed the federal government’s 
administrative capacities.335 This characterization might be plausible if 
Mexico offered refugees a true safe haven, but it does not. Mexico has not 
promised MPP migrants asylum or even withholding of removal, but merely 
“temporary entrance” pending the resolution of U.S. immigration 
proceedings.336 Moreover, human-rights organizations have shown that 
Mexico “is not a uniformly safe country for all asylum-seekers” because 
 
Interviewing Families for “Credible Fear,” L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019, 5:50 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-09-19/border-patrol-interview-migrant-families-credible-
fear [https://perma.cc/PB4B-TYD3]. 
 332 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Migrant Protection Protocols (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01/24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/W5M7-XGUY] 
[hereinafter MPP] (explaining that the MPP does not apply, inter alia, to Mexican nationals who “more 
likely than not [would] face persecution or torture in Mexico” and unaccompanied children). 
 333 See Nicole Acevedo, New Border Tent Courts Create a ‘Faux Process’ for Asylum-Seekers, 
Attorneys Say, NBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2019, 4:34 PM), https://nbcnews.com/news/latino/new-border-tent-
courts-create-faux-process-asylum-seekers-attorneys-n1053196 [https://perma.cc/9FK6-SVDY] 
(describing tent facilities established in Brownsville and Laredo, Texas, to handle these cases). DHS has 
argued that the MPP is a valid implementation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(C), which authorizes the Attorney 
General to return foreign nationals “arriving on land (whether or not at a designated port of arrival) from 
a foreign territory contiguous to the United States . . . pending a [status-determination] proceeding.” MPP, 
supra note 332. 
 334 See First Remain in Mexico Refugee Granted Asylum, Yet Government Threatens to Return Him 
to Danger, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-release/first-
remain-mexico-refugee-granted-asylum-yet-government-threatens-return-him-danger 
[https://perma.cc/2HWN-6SJG] (reporting that “the first individual forced to remain in Mexico under the 
[MPP had been] granted asylum” by an IJ, but was nonetheless being threatened with return to Mexico 
for the duration of DHS’s appeal to the BIA). 
 335 MPP, supra note 332; Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Homeland Sec., to L. 
Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Nielsen Memorandum], 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-
policy-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/BAX4-GLTK] (providing policy guidance for implementation of 
the Migrant Protection Protocols). 
 336 Nielsen Memorandum, supra note 335, at 2 (quoting an official statement of the Government of 
Mexico dated December 20, 2018). 
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“Mexican immigration officials routinely deport[] asylum-seekers to 
potential persecution in their countries-of-origin, in violation of Mexican and 
international law.”337 Indeed, critics have speculated that the Trump 
Administration has instituted the MPP to establish a process whereby 
refugees are returned indirectly to their home countries. According to 
Amnesty International, “senior Mexican immigration officials” have 
acknowledged “that US authorities encouraged [them] to detain and check 
the legal status of asylum-seekers whom CBP was forcing to wait in Mexico, 
with a potential view to deporting [asylum-seekers] to their countries-of-
origin.”338 Moreover, an anonymous asylum officer has objected that the 
MPP “is calculated to prevent individuals from receiving any type of 
protection or immigration benefits in the future” by “ensur[ing] that a high 
number of applicants will” not receive notice “of changes to hearing dates 
and times” and will thereby “miss their [immigration] court dates.”339 If this 
allegation is accurate, it would mean that the Executive Branch has 
established the MPP not for the purpose of protecting asylum-seekers and 
promoting an orderly and humane screening process, but rather to achieve 
attrition through enforcement340 and indirect refoulement in violation of 
domestic and international law.341 
These are not the only reasons for concern. Human-rights organizations 
have expressed alarm that Mexico does not authorize MPP refugees to work, 
study, or receive social services within its borders.342 Hence, refugees in 
 
 337 USA: “You Don’t Have Any Rights Here,” AMNESTY INT’L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/ 
research/2018/10/usa-treatment-of-asylum-seekers-southern-border/ [https://perma.cc/X4XF-PFPP]. 
 338 Id. 
 339 E-mail from Asylum Officer to USCIS Mgmt. [hereinafter Asylum Officer], 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/read-the-email-former-asylum-officer-blasts-trump-s-remain-
in-mexico-policy/bd0e07ea-2b91-4d5b-9bc1-4fb01500359a/ [https://perma.cc/3LST-CBFB]. This e-
mail was sent after an August 8, 2019 meeting with management concerning the officer’s refusal to 
participate in the Migration Protection Protocols (Remain in Mexico) Program. Id. 
 340 Id. 
 341 Indirect refoulement occurs when states send refugees “to countries where protection against non-
refoulement is not ensured, or to countries which may refuse entry, and which may refoule such persons 
to the country where they fear persecution.” 1 UNHCR, AN OVERVIEW OF PROTECTION ISSUES IN 
EUROPE: LEGISLATIVE TRENDS AND POSITIONS TAKEN BY UNHCR 96 (1995), 
http://www.unhcr.org/46e65e1e2.html [https://perma.cc/C7R5-LFAA]; see also Refugee Convention, 
supra note 12, art. 33 (“No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (emphasis 
added)); Asylum Officer, supra note 339 (“[T]he MPP practically ensures violation of our international 
obligation of non-refoulement.”). 
 342 See HUM. RTS. WATCH, “WE CAN’T HELP YOU HERE”: US RETURNS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS TO 
MEXICO 2 (2019), https://hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us_mexico0719_web2.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3K84-CRJY]; Levi Vonk, Mexico Isn’t Helping Refugees. It’s Depriving Them of Their Rights, 
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Mexico “have both immediate and long-term needs to access food, water, 
shelter, communication with family and lawyers, and other necessities, but 
have been left with no legal means to earn the income required to do so.”343 
Although the Mexican government has established temporary shelters for 
asylum-seekers, shelters in Juárez have space for fewer than 10% of those 
returned to Mexico under the MPP,344 and this disparity is only increasing as 
the number of MPP returnees continues to rise. In July 2019 alone, the 
United States returned 11,804 migrants to Mexico under the MPP.345 By 
September 2019, 66,000 returnees were in Mexico awaiting MPP hearings 
or decisions in their cases.346 Meanwhile, many refugees in Mexico have been 
cast adrift on the streets of notoriously dangerous cities such as Ciudad 
Juárez, where they lack shelter and have become easy prey for criminal 
gangs.347 The MPP program thus exposes refugees in Mexico to intolerable 
conditions that violate their most basic human rights.348 
Partially in recognition of these factors, the Ninth Circuit recently 
upheld a preliminary injunction to set aside the MPP.349 The court concluded 
that the MPP likely violates the United States’ obligation under both the INA 
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refoulement-honduras-central-america-turkey-syria/ [https://perma.cc/G5JF-2XU5]. 
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/18/trumps-migrant-protection-protocols-hurt-
people-theyre-supposed-help/?utm_term=.946a663b5a88 (last visited Nov. 7, 2020) (“Without money or 
work permits, [MPP] migrants end up sleeping in abandoned housing or outside, at risk of rape, 
kidnapping, robbery and murder.”). 
 348 See Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Problem of Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
Who Move in an Irregular Manner from a Country in Which They Had Already Found Protection, No. 
58 (XL), U.N. Doc. A/44/12/Add.1 (Oct. 13, 1989) (concluding that asylum-seekers may be returned to 
transit countries only if they are “treated in accordance with recognized basic human standards until a 
durable solution is found for them”). 
 349 See Innovation L. Lab v. Wolf, 951 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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and the Refugee Protocol to refrain from refoulement, because the MPP calls 
for Central American refugees to be driven back to Mexico where they face 
violence and other persecution on account of their non-Mexican 
nationality.350 In particular, the court upheld the district court’s findings that 
Central American refugees in Mexico were subject to “targeted 
discrimination, physical violence, sexual assault, overwhelmed and corrupt 
law enforcement, lack of food and shelter, and practical obstacles to 
participation in court proceedings in the United States.”351 The court 
therefore held that DHS must suspend the MPP and allow asylum-seekers to 
receive safe haven within the United States while their applications for relief 
are pending. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court agreed to stay the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling, allowing the MPP to remain in force while DHS 
pursues Supreme Court review.352 
Given the persecution that Central American refugees have endured in 
Mexico under the Remain in Mexico policy, is it any wonder that many have 
chosen to bypass the MPP, risking life and limb to enter the United States 
unlawfully?353 Can they reasonably be blamed for violating U.S. immigration 
controls when this course of action is necessary to address their well-founded 
fear of persecution? If the answer to these questions is “no,” then prosecuting 
refugees for such acts is morally indefensible. 
Even if DHS eventually rolls back the Remain in Mexico policy, giving 
refugees unfettered access to relief at ports of entry, DOJ’s zero-tolerance 
policy would still be immoral as applied to refugees. As the Ninth Circuit 
has noted, “refugees fleeing imminent persecution do not have the luxury of 
choosing their escape route into the United States.”354 Without visas, most 
refugees overseas have no lawful pathway to access official ports of entry by 
air or sea. Many rely on smugglers to facilitate their flight to freedom and 
therefore are not in a position to dictate precisely where they will enter U.S. 
territory.355 When refugees finally arrive at a U.S. border, they often lack the 
 
 350 Id. at 1087–93. 
 351 Id. at 1078. 
 352 See Wolf v. Innovation L. Lab., 140 S. Ct. 1564 (mem.) (2020). 
 353 See Missing Migrants: Tracking Deaths Along Migratory Routes, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, 
https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/americas?region=1422 [https://perma.cc/5KBV-9RSE] 
(providing estimates of the number of deaths resulting from illegal crossings of the U.S.–Mexico border, 
which were higher in 2019 than in the five years preceding). 
 354 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1259 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 125 CONG. 
REC. 35,813–14 (1979) (statement of Rep. Holtzman)). 
 355 See James C. Hathaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 6 (2008) (observing that cracking down on human smuggling is problematic, from a human-rights 
perspective, because “refugees must routinely rely upon smugglers and even traffickers in order to escape 
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financial resources and knowledge of local geography necessary to reach a 
distant port of entry.356 Indeed, the more vulnerable a refugee’s position, the 
less likely it is that she will be able to travel to a designated port of entry 
from her first point of contact with a U.S. border.357 Accordingly, the idea 
that refugees are morally culpable for failing to pursue relief at an official 
port of entry is based on assumptions about refugee mobility that are at odds 
with most refugees’ extreme vulnerability and highly constrained choices in 
the real world. 
Taking a different tack, the federal government has argued that 
prosecuting refugees is morally justified if refugees fail to avail themselves 
of opportunities to seek asylum in third countries through which they passed 
en route to the United States.358 This argument rests on the dubious premise 
that refugees can find safe haven elsewhere. There are good reasons to doubt 
that this premise is accurate for many refugees, including those from Central 
America. The three Northern Triangle countries—El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras—have not established “full and fair” procedures for 
adjudicating asylum claims and have not allocated the resources necessary 
to protect refugees’ human rights.359 Mexico likewise has a woefully 
 
their own country because no state grants refugees legal authorization to travel for the purpose of seeking 
asylum”). 
 356 See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 950 F.3d at 1276 (“Many migrants enter between ports of entry 
out of necessity: they ‘cannot satisfy regular exit and entry requirements and have no choice but to cross 
into a safe country irregularly prior to making an asylum claim.’” (quoting Brief for UNHCR as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 15, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 950 F.3d 1242 (No. 18-17274), 
ECF No. 34)). 
 357 See id. at 1274 (“The most vulnerable refugees are perhaps those fleeing across the border through 
the point physically closest to them.”). 
 358 In July 2019, Attorney General William Barr issued an interim final rule disqualifying refugees 
who cross the U.S. border from receiving asylum (but not withholding of removal) if they failed to apply 
for protection in third countries through which they passed en route to the United States. See Asylum 
Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829 (proposed July 16, 2019) (to be codified 
at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1208). The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a 
preliminary injunction to prevent DHS from enforcing the rule, but the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the 
district court’s order pending appellate review. See Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 140 S. Ct. 3, 3 
(mem.) (2019). 
 359 See Nicole Narea, Trump’s Agreements in Central America Are Dismantling the Asylum System 
as We Know It, VOX (Nov. 20, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/ 
9/26/20870768/trump-agreement-honduras-guatemala-el-salvador-explained [https://perma.cc/2D49-
DVHB] (observing that “Northern Triangle countries lack anything resembling a legitimate asylum 
system”); id. (quoting Professor Karen Musalo’s observation: “It’s like saying, ‘Your house was just 
destroyed by an earthquake but there’s a house down the street that is on fire. Why don’t you seek refuge 
there?”). Recently, the Trump Administration has struck deals with the three Northern Triangle countries 
to allow the United States to redirect refugees to those countries. See, e.g., John Washington, Sweeping 
Language in Asylum Agreement Foists U.S. Responsibilities onto El Salvador, INTERCEPT (Sept. 23, 
2019, 8:58 PM), https://theintercept.com/2019/09/23/el-salvador-asylum-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/ 
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inadequate system for handling asylum petitions and has become notorious 
for returning asylum-seekers to their home countries in violation of 
international law.360 Accordingly, the Trump Administration’s suggestion 
that it can morally punish refugees who do not pursue relief in these countries 
betrays either its ignorance of actual Northern Triangle state practices, or its 
indifference to the dangers that drive many Central American refugees to 
undertake their perilous passage to the United States. 
In sum, refugees often have compelling moral justifications for illegally 
entering or reentering the United States. As long as refugees have not 
received an offer of firm resettlement elsewhere,361 the United States cannot 
ethically prosecute them for sidestepping domestic border controls in pursuit 
of refuge.362 
2. Excuses 
Refugees may also have powerful excuses for violating domestic 
immigration controls. Unlike justifications, which address the morality of 
particular acts, excuses “focus on the actor” herself; “they exculpate even 
though the actor’s conduct may have harmed society because the actor, for 
whatever reason, is not judged to be blameworthy.”363 Acts that are not 
objectively justified may nonetheless be exculpated if, for example, the actor 
 
DGF9-XCFH]. Implementing these agreements would be illegal, in my view, because the lack of “full 
and fair” asylum processes in the receiving states would threaten refugees with refoulement in violation 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A). 
 360 See E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 953–56 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(summarizing reports from UNHCR, Doctors Without Borders, Human Rights First, and other 
organizations documenting how Mexico lacks credible procedures for conferring durable protection to 
refugees); AMNESTY INT’L, OVERLOOKED, UNDER-PROTECTED: MEXICO’S DEADLY REFOULEMENT OF 
CENTRAL AMERICANS SEEKING ASYLUM 5 (2018), https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/01/AMR4176022018-ENGLISH-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMQ7-DCGD] (documenting 
widespread violations of the principle of nonrefoulement by Mexican authorities). 
 361 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (providing that an alien is statutorily barred from asylum if she 
was “firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States”). 
 362 DHS regulations codify this principle by stating that an alien will not be considered “firmly 
resettled” unless she “entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an offer of 
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 
(2006). Even if such an offer has been extended, a refugee will not be considered “firmly resettled” if her 
“entry into [a transit] country was a necessary consequence of [her] flight from persecution,” she 
“remained in that country only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and [she] did not 
establish significant ties in that country,” or if her conditions of residence were “substantially and 
consciously restricted” by the transit country. Id. 
 363 Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They 
Ought to Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 726 (2004). 
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acted involuntarily due to external coercion, cognitive incapacity, or other 
mitigating circumstances.364 
Moral philosophers generally agree that criminal acts should be excused 
if an actor reasonably believed that the acts were necessary for her own self-
preservation.365 For retributivists, self-preservation excuses criminal acts 
because no one could be blamed for refusing to sacrifice her own life or basic 
liberties for the sake of compliance with the law.366 Utilitarians, in turn, 
accept excuses as exculpating reasons for potentially criminal action because 
the criminal law cannot serve as an effective deterrent when an actor’s own 
life or basic freedoms are on the line.367 Both schools should therefore be 
prepared to accept that when a refugee faces a credible threat of persecution 
abroad, her well-founded fear may excuse an irregular border crossing that 
is necessary to facilitate her flight to freedom. 
Fear of future persecution is not the only subjective factor that may 
excuse violations of domestic immigration law. Habituated distrust of public 
officials may cause refugees to distrust law enforcement officials 
elsewhere—including in third countries where they seek protection.368 
Federal courts have also recognized that because refugees frequently 
“receive misinformation, from smugglers and others, about the appropriate 
way to seek refuge in this country,” they are often “unaware that [they] could 
safely enter legally.”369 In such cases, criminal “prosecution penalizes [them] 
for [their] ignorance, in contradiction of our government’s policy of 
providing safe haven to refugees fleeing political violence and 
 
 364 See FLETCHER, supra note 311, at 803 (observing that criminal acts may be excused by “moral or 
normative involuntariness” or “physical involuntariness”); Greenawalt, supra note 311, at 938 (observing 
that criminal law excuses for “involuntary” acts cover not only acts that are “not deliberate,” but also 
those performed “under constraint or duress”). 
 365 See, e.g., 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION ch. XIII, § 1, III (London, W. Pickering 1823) (concluding that “punishment ought not to 
be inflicted” where it would be “inefficacious” because it would not deter “mischief”); THOMAS HOBBES, 
LEVIATHAN 208 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651) (“If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled 
to do[] a fact against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his 
own preservation.”); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 36 (J. Ladd trans., 
2d ed. 1999) (1797) (arguing that that crimes committed for self-preservation qualify for a “subjective 
exemption from punishment” (i.e., excuse), not an “objective legality” (i.e., justification)). 
 366 See, e.g., KANT, supra note 365, at 36. 
 367 See, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 365, ch. VIII, § 1, III. 
 368 See United States v. Malenge, 294 F. App’x 642, 645 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasizing “that some 
refugees, particularly those fleeing political violence, harbor a natural distrust of government officials”). 
To be sure, some refugees seek entry into the United States precisely because they do trust the U.S. 
government to protect their human rights. This does not necessarily mean, however, that they trust U.S. 
border agents to assist their flight from persecution. 
 369 Id. at 644–45. 
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persecution.”370 Combine these factors with the extreme emotional distress 
that many refugees experience due to past trauma,371 and it becomes 
increasingly difficult to imagine how a zero-tolerance policy for immigration 
crimes could be applied ethically to all refugees, as there are clear excuses 
for their potentially criminal behavior. 
C. Refugee Prosecution and the Rule of Law 
Thus far, this Part has identified moral considerations that weigh against 
prosecuting refugees based on the justifiability of particular acts or 
considerations that excuse specific actors. A third factor weighing against 
refugee prosecution is the moral responsibility that public authorities bear to 
respect people subject to their jurisdiction as rational, self-determining 
agents. When well-founded fears of persecution drive refugees to violate 
U.S. border controls in search of safety, prosecuting them for such acts may 
be inconsistent with the United States’ moral obligation to respect the rule 
of law. 
Skeptics might object that I have it exactly backwards. Doesn’t fidelity 
to the rule of law oblige public authorities to enforce the law’s 
proscriptions—even against refugees? Wouldn’t a state undermine the rule 
of law if it declined to punish refugees for unlawful entry? Not necessarily. 
To understand why this is so, it may be helpful to reflect briefly on why at 
least some legal philosophers have understood the rule of law to be morally 
consequential. 
The rule of law draws attention to the manner in which public 
authorities exercise power over people subject to their jurisdiction. Many 
legal theorists resist the idea that the rule of law has a moral dimension.372 
An influential strand in rule-of-law discourse, however, is Lon Fuller’s 
 
 370 Id. at 644. Although “[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law . . . is no defense to criminal 
prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal system,” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 
(1991), moral philosophers do not uniformly endorse this maxim as an accurate assessment of moral 
responsibility. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, IGNORANCE OF LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 1–2 (2016) 
(arguing that when criminal laws do not target acts malum in se, ignorance of the law is a valid moral 
excuse and should be a complete excuse from criminal liability). Moreover, whatever force the maxim 
might have in other settings, it is less defensible as applied to refugees, who are often compelled to flee 
their home countries without advance warning and therefore typically lack the opportunity to become 
acquainted with U.S. criminal and immigration law before they reach a U.S. border. 
 371 See UNHCR, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK TO GUIDE RECEPTION 
AND INTEGRATION 233 (2002), http://www.refworld.org/docid/405189284.html [https://perma.cc/68EB-
HSQR] (citing clinical studies, which suggest that “rates of post traumatic stress disorder [among 
refugees] rang[e] from between 39% and 100% (compared with 1% in the general population)” (citations 
omitted)). 
 372 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND MORALITY 210, 224–25 (2d ed. 1979). 
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insight that legal directives must satisfy certain formal criteria to fulfill a 
state’s moral obligation to respect people as rational, self-determining 
agents.373 For example, legal directives must express general, not ad hoc, 
commands; must not be contradictory; and must not “require conduct beyond 
the powers of the affected party.”374 A directive that does not satisfy these 
desiderata would not comport with the rule of law because it would not 
afford a rational basis for people to orient their behavior in response to it.375 
As Fuller explains, 
[T]here can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral 
obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or 
that came into existence only after he had acted, or was unintelligible, or was 
contradicted by another rule of the same system, or commanded the impossible, 
or changed every minute.376 
When a legal directive does not appeal to a party’s reason, Fuller suggests, 
the “bond of reciprocity” between the state and its people is “completely 
ruptured,” negating “the citizen’s duty to observe the rules.”377 
Fuller’s conception of the rule of law suggests that states cannot morally 
prosecute refugees who violate domestic immigration controls in pursuit of 
safety from persecution. As states recognized during negotiations over the 
Refugee Convention, threatening a refugee with prosecution for illegal entry 
essentially entraps him “between two sovereign orders, one ordering him to 
leave the country [or face persecution] and the other forbidding his entry 
[under pain of criminal sanctions].”378 The refugee in this setting faces 
contradictory commands from multiple sovereigns; irrespective of which 
command he obeys, he will be consigned to “lead[] the life of an outlaw.”379 
With no legal option for safe residence, his very existence becomes an 
 
 373 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39–40 (rev. ed. 1969). Although not all scholars 
endorse Fuller’s account of the rule of law as a moral ideal, Fuller’s formal criteria have been cited by 
scholars of diverse theoretical orientations as an appropriate starting point for inquiry into the rule of law. 
See, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW 61–89 
(2001); ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE AGE OF PLURALISM 6–10 (2007); N.E. SIMMONDS, LAW AS A 
MORAL IDEA 64–68 (2007); Evan Fox-Decent, Is the Rule of Law Really Indifferent to Human Rights?, 
27 LAW & PHIL. 533, 535–37 (2008); Matthew H. Kramer, On the Moral Status of the Rule of Law, 
63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 65, 65 (2004). 
 374 FULLER, supra note 373, at 39. 
 375 Id. 
 376 Id. For further discussion of Fuller’s reciprocity-based conception of the rule of law, see PAUL 
GOWDER, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE REAL WORLD 74–77 (2016), and KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS 
LIBERATE: RECLAIMING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LON L. FULLER 97–101 (2012). 
 377 FULLER, supra note 373, at 40. 
 378 WEIS, supra note 83, at 202. 
 379 Id. 
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illegality.380 “In this way,” domestic criminal prohibitions that are “intended 
to protect law and order” actually “achieve the opposite result”—subverting 
the rule of law within a global context “when an attempt is made to apply 
them to refugees without taking into account [refugees’] peculiar 
position.”381 
A more substantively robust conception of the rule of law offers 
additional reasons to reject refugee prosecution.382 Some sovereign 
commands fail to respect human rationality and agency, not because they are 
formally contradictory or demand the impossible, but because they call for 
individuals to perform acts that no rational person could be expected to 
perform. To be sure, a state can reasonably demand that individuals act 
against their own immediate interests in a variety of circumstances. As Scott 
Shapiro has observed, obedience to inconvenient laws can be understood as 
“the moral price that parties must pay in order to secure the compliance of 
others.”383 Accordingly, a rational person could choose to submit to an 
authority who acts against her interests in some settings to secure reciprocal 
compliance from the state and other people for other aspects of the law’s 
grand bargain. But there are some acts that a state may never demand of its 
people because no rational person would accept such directives as part of a 
grand bargain. In particular, no rational person would voluntarily submit to 
a legal system that calls for or allows her own extrajudicial killing, torture, 
or prolonged arbitrary detention. Domestic laws that countenance such 
measures are anathema to a substantively robust account of the rule of law 
because they treat people as mere objects of state power, rather than as 
purposeful, self-determining agents who are entitled to secure and equal 
freedom.384 By the same reasoning, a state that uses criminal sanctions to 
 
 380 See RIPSTEIN, supra note 238, at 298 & n.48 (“If . . . you cannot safely return [to your home state] 
because its rulers are making war on their own people . . . , the right of any other state to exclude you 
runs up against its own internal limit.”); Mattias Kumm, Constitutionalism and the Cosmopolitan State 
16–17 (N.Y.U. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 13-68, 2013) (“In order to justify 
excluding someone from a state that person must have access to some other state that does not violate his 
or her rights.”). 
 381 WEIS, supra note 83, at 202. 
 382 See Fox-Decent, supra note 373, at 535, 538–39 (arguing that respect for human rights is an 
essential component of the rule of law). 
 383 See Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 433 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 384 See Fox-Decent, supra note 373, at 576–78. Significantly, international law characterizes the 
prohibitions on extrajudicial killing, torture, slavery, and prolonged arbitrary detention as “peremptory 
norms” (jus cogens) that states may never violate under any circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELS. OF THE U.S. § 702 cmts. d–i, § 102 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 1987). In previous writings, 
Evan Fox-Decent and I have explained how these norms are integral to a substantively robust conception 
of the rule of law. See, e.g., Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Internal Morality of International 
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deter refugees from accessing protection, or to punish those who do, assumes 
an attitude of hostility or indifference toward refugees that is incompatible 
with the rule of law. Therefore, there can be no rational ground for asserting 
that people have a moral obligation to obey laws that prohibit crossing 
borders when such acts are necessary to escape persecution. 
Considered alongside refugees’ powerful justifications and excuses for 
entering the United States outside an authorized port of entry, these rule of 
law concerns help to explain why the United States has joined with other 
states to outlaw refugee prosecution in the Refugee Protocol. They also 
clarify why Congress has refrained from penalizing refugees for illegal entry 
and reentry in the INA, and they strengthen the case for concluding that 
prosecuting refugees constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment. 
D. Reviving Necessity and Duress 
Although federal courts have been slow to recognize the moral stakes 
of refugee prosecution, the same ethical considerations that support 
exempting refugees from criminal liability under the Refugee Protocol and 
the INA also arguably support allowing refugees to raise successful necessity 
and duress defenses. Under the common law, necessity and duress eliminate 
criminal liability in settings where a defendant lacks moral culpability for 
otherwise criminal acts. Necessity applies when a defendant’s acts are 
morally justified,385 while duress excuses criminal conduct when a defendant 
lacked sufficient voluntariness to incur moral culpability.386 As safeguards 
against unwarranted punishment, these defenses also contribute to ensuring 
that criminal penalties are compatible with a morally robust conception of 
the rule of law. Although some legal and ethical aspects of necessity and 
duress defenses remain controversial, the better view is that federal courts 
should allow refugees to use these defenses in many cases to escape criminal 
liability for illegal entry and reentry.387 
 
Law, 63 MCGILL L.J. 765, 767–68 (2018); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of 
Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 332–33 (2009). 
 385 See United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that necessity 
“justifies criminal acts taken to avert a greater harm, maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to 
be committed where the social benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs of failing to commit the 
crime”). 
 386 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (AM. L. INST. 2019) (providing that duress applies if an “actor 
engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or 
threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist”). 
 387 The Supreme Court has recognized that traditional common law defenses are available under 
federal criminal law unless precluded by statute. See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 17 (2006) 
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A classic scenario where necessity and duress defenses apply is a prison 
fire. Although escaping from prison is a crime, the Supreme Court has 
explained that a prisoner can avoid liability for this crime “when the prison 
is on fire—‘for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be 
burnt.’”388 In the prison fire scenario, an otherwise criminal act is morally 
justified under the circumstances to the extent that it is necessary to preserve 
the inmate’s life (i.e., necessity). Moreover, even if breaking prison were not 
objectively justified, the inmate’s reasonable perception of the gravity of the 
threat may excuse her failure to comply with the law (i.e., duress).389 
By the same logic, refugees should be able to assert successful necessity 
and duress defenses to prosecution for illegal entry and reentry. Threatening 
a refugee with prosecution for an unauthorized border crossing is akin to 
forcing a prisoner to choose between burning or hanging. The refugee 
similarly must choose between two evils: either endure persecution in her 
home country or be branded a criminal if she bypasses U.S. border controls 
in pursuit of asylum. Given this choice, a refugee’s decision to escape 
persecution in her home country (the greater evil) may justify and excuse her 
transgression of U.S. border controls (the lesser evil). 
Notably, in the dozens of reported cases where refugees have asserted 
necessity and duress defenses to prosecution for illegal entry and reentry, no 
court has ever held that §§ 1325(a) and 1326 foreclose these defenses. 
Instead, courts have tended to reject these defenses on a case-by-case basis 
because refugees could not satisfy two requirements: (1) a threat of imminent 
harm, and (2) exhaustion of alternative remedies.390 
 
(establishing the federal evidentiary burden for a duress defense); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 
410, 415 n.11 (1980) (“We . . . recognize that Congress in enacting criminal statutes legislates against a 
background of Anglo-Saxon common law . . . .”). To date, however, the Court has not had occasion to 
decide definitively whether refugees may rely on necessity or duress as a defense to prosecution for illegal 
entry or reentry. See generally United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 
(2001) (“[I]t is an open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity 
defense not provided by statute.”). For purposes of this discussion, I assume that necessity is available as 
a defense to illegal entry and reentry charges because Congress has not indicated to the contrary in the 
INA’s text or legislative history. 
 388 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 487 (1868) (quoting EDMUND PLOWDEN, ON 
1 EDWARD I (1307)); see also Bailey, 444 US at 415 (quoting this passage from Kirby with approval); 
Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 226 (1921) (same). 
 389 See People v. Lovercamp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 116 (Ct. App. 1974) (endorsing these principles). 
 390 See, e.g., United States v. Bonilla-Siciliano, 643 F.3d 589, 591 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that 
the defendant could not establish a necessity defense because he “failed to identify any specific threat to 
his safety, and relied only on a generalized fear of harm from the government and gang members” and 
“did not exclude the option of going to a country other than the United States”); United States v. Grainger, 
239 F. App’x 188, 190–92 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a refugee who traveled through Canada could 
not establish a necessity defense to illegal reentry); United States v. Fashola, No. 94-5769, 1995 WL 
686329, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 1995) (rejecting a Nigerian asylum-seeker’s justification defense, in part, 
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Conventional wisdom suggests that the imminence and exhaustion 
requirements for necessity and duress serve a common purpose: 
incentivizing people to seek assistance from public officials before they take 
the law into their own hands.391 For example, if a prison inmate faces a threat 
of physical abuse from other prisoners, she must ordinarily request 
protection from prison officers or the courts before resorting to a prison 
break. If a prisoner cannot demonstrate imminence or exhaustion of 
remedies, she cannot show that public officials would have been unwilling 
or unable to render timely assistance.392 Consequently, she cannot meet her 
burden to prove that breaking prison was justified under the circumstances, 
nor can she demonstrate that her actions were morally excused on the ground 
that a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to resist the 
temptation to break prison. Without a viable moral justification or excuse, 
her necessity and duress defenses to criminal charges for breaking prison 
would likewise fail.393 
In the past, federal courts have concluded that refugees cannot satisfy 
the imminence requirement without showing that they faced an immediate 
threat of persecution at the very moment when they crossed into the United 
States.394 Although this approach lies well within the mainstream of federal 
 
because the defendant “has not presented any evidence . . . as to why he could not have fled to another 
country”); United States v. Brizuela, No. B–13–CR–476–1, 2014 WL 2257405, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 
2014) (concluding that because “a generalized fear of harm in the future is insufficient to meet the 
imminent harm element” for duress, “[d]efendant’s testimony that he generally feared for his life in El 
Salvador . . . is insufficient to meet the imminent harm element of duress”); United States v. Crown, No. 
99 CR. 1044 (AGS), 2000 WL 709003, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2000) (rejecting a necessity defense for 
a defendant who reentered the United States to gain access to a life-sustaining treatment for HIV/AIDS 
that was unavailable in his own country because “defendant had the option of traveling to a country other 
than the United States in order to seek treatment”). 
 391 Cf. George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 
553, 570 (1996) (“[T]he imminence requirement expresses the limits of governmental competence: when 
the danger to a protected interest is imminent and unavoidable, . . . the police are no longer in a position 
to intervene and exercise the state’s functioning of securing public safety.”). 
 392 See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410–11 (“Clearly, in the context of prison escape, the escapee is not 
entitled to claim a defense of duress or necessity unless and until he demonstrates that, given the 
imminence of the threat, [breaking out of prison] was his only reasonable alternative.”). 
 393 See United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that because “the 
task . . . of protecting prisoners from assaults within prisons rests [primarily] with correctional officials,” 
a necessity defense applies only in the “few and very limited circumstances” when it is not “possible for 
an endangered inmate to secure protection from correctional officials or from the courts”); Lovercamp, 
118 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (suggesting that a defendant must show that there was “no time for a complaint to 
the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints 
illusory”). 
 394 See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Chavez, No. 13–00490 DAE, 2013 WL 3581959, at *4 (W.D. 
Tex. July 2, 2013) (rejecting a defendant’s duress defense because his kidnappers near the U.S.–Mexico 
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case law, it arguably cuts too narrowly. Some criminal law theorists have 
argued that imminence analysis should focus not on whether harm was 
imminent at the time a defendant acted, but rather whether the defendant had 
an immediate need to take action in order to prevent the threatened harm.395 
An otherwise unlawful act may be morally permissible, in other words, when 
it is immediately necessary to avert harm, irrespective of whether the 
anticipated harm is proximate in time or place.396 Consistent with this 
thinking, one federal district court has held that an Ethiopian refugee who 
escaped from immigration detention could assert a valid necessity or duress 
defense to criminal charges based on the “ultimate harm” awaiting him 
abroad, even if that harm would occur in a distant location at an unknown 
future date.397 In another case, a refugee faced prosecution for assaulting 
DHS officers on an airplane in order to prevent them from returning him to 
Togo, where he feared persecution.398 The district court agreed that the 
defendant could assert a necessity defense even if the “persecution . . . or 
danger” awaiting him in Togo “was not physically present at the precise 
moment” when the altercation occurred.399 Although these two decisions are 
outliers in federal case law, they reflect a common moral calculus. In both 
cases, the district courts reasoned that criminal violations could be morally 
justified or excused—even if the threat was not physically or temporally 
immediate at the time—as long as refugees needed to act swiftly to avoid a 
serious risk of persecution in their countries of origin. 
This approach to imminence would reframe how federal courts 
approach necessity and duress defenses in the context of refugee prosecution 
under §§ 1325(a) and 1326. When evaluating necessity, courts would 
determine whether a refugee had to enter the United States at the time she 
did to avoid a serious risk of harm in her home country or a transit country. 
 
border “were not in hot pursuit” when he “slipped away . . . unnoticed” and “crossed the Rio Grande river 
without anyone pursuing him”). 
 395 See, e.g., Robert F. Schopp, Barbara J. Sturgis & Megan Sullivan, Battered Woman Syndrome, 
Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 69 
(“Immediate necessity, not imminence of harm, should be considered essential to self-defense 
claims . . . .”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 105, 
127 (1990) (“Imminence is relevant only because it helps identify cases where flight or legal intervention 
will be impossible, so that violent self-help becomes truly necessary. The decisive factor is necessity, not 
imminence per se.”). But see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to 
Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 247 (2004) (critiquing this approach to self-defense on the ground that the 
use of force requires special justification). 
 396 Of course, in most self-defense cases a defendant will struggle to prove that the use of force was 
strictly necessary if her assailant’s attack had yet to commence. 
 397 United States v. Dagnachew, 808 F. Supp. 1517, 1523 (D. Colo. 1992). 
 398 United States v. Kpomassie, 323 F. Supp. 2d 894, 896–97 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). 
 399 Id. at 901. 
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If so, the anticipated harm would be sufficiently imminent, in the relevant 
sense, to justify the refugee’s circumvention of U.S. border controls. 
Similarly, when a refugee reasonably believes that traveling to the United 
States is immediately necessary to escape persecution, this belief would be 
sufficient to establish a duress defense without a refugee having to show that 
her persecutors chased her all the way to the U.S. border. Under this 
“immediate need” approach to imminence, many refugees would have valid 
necessity and duress defenses to illegal entry and reentry charges. 
The exhaustion of remedies requirement for necessity and duress 
defenses should be even easier for refugees to satisfy. Keep in mind that 
asylum-seekers cannot qualify as refugees in the first place without 
demonstrating that public officials in their country of origin would be either 
the source of their persecution or unable or unwilling to protect them from 
nonstate actors.400 By definition, therefore, all refugees can show that they 
have exhausted the remedies available to them in their home country. 
The suggestion that a refugee cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement 
without showing that no other country in the world would grant her asylum 
is morally suspect. As long as a refugee has not received a firm offer of 
resettlement elsewhere, faulting her for seeking protection in the United 
States is like blaming a starving hiker for breaking into one unoccupied cabin 
rather than another in order to obtain life-sustaining provisions. When a 
starving hiker stumbles upon several cabins but has not received an invitation 
to enter any of them, her otherwise unlawful act of breaking and entering 
into any particular cabin may be morally justified and excused to preserve 
her life. Similarly, when a refugee has the option to pursue protection in 
multiple countries, her decision to enter any particular country should not be 
punishable on the ground that asylum might have been available elsewhere. 
As long as a refugee has not received a firm offer of resettlement abroad, the 
mere hypothetical possibility that she might be able to access relief 
somewhere else in the world should not prevent her from asserting successful 
necessity and duress defenses in the United States. The common law’s moral 
foundations thus arguably support the view that refugees have valid necessity 
and duress defenses to criminal charges under §§ 1325(a) and 1326. 
 
 400 See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985) (holding that term “persecution” in 
Refugee Act encompasses only harm inflicted “either by the government of a country or by persons or an 
organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control”), overruled in part on other grounds 
by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987). 
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E. How Prosecution Undermines Protection 
Perhaps recognizing the weight of these moral objections, defenders of 
refugee prosecution sometimes advance another argument: the prejudicial 
impact of this practice is limited because refugees are still free to seek asylum 
and withholding of removal in immigration court.401 This argument is 
unconvincing for several reasons. 
First, in practice, refugees are not always free to petition for asylum and 
withholding of removal after they complete their criminal sentences.402 
According to one recent report, defendants near the U.S.–Mexico border who 
are sentenced to time served are typically “taken straight to the bridge or 
deported after court.”403 Hence, if criminal defense counsel is not “forceful” 
in asserting their clients’ desire to apply for relief from removal (a matter 
outside their official purview), refugees may be summarily expelled without 
receiving an opportunity to communicate their fear of persecution to an 
asylum officer or immigration judge.404 Further, after a refugee has been 
removed from the United States, she cannot qualify for asylum following a 
subsequent reentry if the government requests to have the first removal order 
summarily “reinstated.”405 The Attorney General might also invoke an 
asylum-seeker’s illegal entry or reentry as a factor weighing against a 
favorable exercise of discretion to grant asylum.406 Cumulatively, these 
 
 401 See, e.g., United States v. Barry, 500 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (arguing that “equity 
does not support” exempting a refugee from criminal liability because “criminal prosecution does not 
prevent her from seeking asylum, and . . . [does not] diminish the success of an asylum application”); 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 29, at 17 (citing CBP’s assertion that “[t]he fact that an undocumented 
alien is being prosecuted does not influence the outcome of his or her credible fear claim”); cf. E. Bay 
Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that the Attorney General may not 
deny asylum based on a refugee’s unlawful entry or presence in the United States). 
 402 See, e.g., Arnpriester, supra note 21, at 6 (recounting the story of an Eritrean torture survivor who 
entered the United States through the U.S.–Mexico border and served time for illegal entry before 
receiving asylum in immigration court). 
 403 GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 65 (quoting immigration attorney Jodi Goodwin); 
see also Kriel, supra note 117 (describing Mexican asylum-seekers who were not afforded an opportunity 
to seek relief in immigration court after their prosecution for illegal entry). 
 404 GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 65; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 
1, at 13–14 (describing the case of two Mexican asylum-seekers who were summarily removed when 
their legal counsel failed to assist them in seeking asylum and withholding of removal). 
 405 See Mejia v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 573, 579–87 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 406 See Policy Memorandum, Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, 
and Refugee Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B-, PM-602-0162, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS. 8 (July 11, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/ 
2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-Memorandum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T34-ML9S] 
(“USCIS personnel may find an applicant’s illegal entry, including any intentional evasion of U.S. 
authorities, and including any conviction for illegal entry where the alien does not demonstrate good 
cause for the illegal entry, to weigh against a favorable exercise of discretion.”). 
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practices have transformed criminal law enforcement into a de facto 
“immigration screener” that prevents refugees from accessing relief in 
immigration court.407 
If this were not bad enough, some U.S. Attorneys’ Offices now require 
that refugees waive their statutory rights to petition for asylum and 
withholding of removal as a precondition for pleading to a reduced charge 
or sentence.408 Refugees in these jurisdictions therefore face a stark choice: 
either they may plead guilty in exchange for time served and face 
refoulement, or they may assert their statutory right to seek relief in 
immigration court and receive a de facto penalty in criminal sentencing. 
Neither option is consistent with the notion that criminal charges do not 
prejudice a refugee’s access to relief from removal. 
Second, even if refugee defendants were actually free to pursue asylum 
and withholding of removal in immigration court, it would be a mistake to 
overlook how criminal sentences can wreak havoc on their lives. Although 
some first-time offenders are sentenced only to time served,409 others remain 
behind bars for as long as six months.410 Prison terms for illegal reentry range 
 
 407 Eagly, supra note 62, at 1289. Sadly, even when asylum-seekers receive credible fear interviews, 
they are sometimes removed inappropriately without being referred for a hearing in immigration court. 
See ALLEN KELLER, ANDREW RASMUSSEN, KIM REEVES & BARRY ROSENFELD, STUDY ON ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EVALUATION OF CREDIBLE FEAR REFERRAL IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 
AT PORTS OF ENTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 20 (2005), https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/ 
resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/evalCredibleFear.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2ZV-Z9JY] (reporting 
the results of a study in which observers noted that “in roughly one sixth of cases in which an alien 
expressed a fear of returning to his or her native country, no referral for a Credible Fear interview was 
made and the alien was either ordered removed or allowed to withdraw his or her application for entry”). 
Moreover, the risk of an errant determination at the credible-fear-interview stage has become greatly 
exacerbated since June 2019, when DHS authorized Border Patrol agents to conduct credible fear 
interviews. Before this change, asylum officers had recommended over 90% of asylum-seekers for 
hearings in immigration court; subsequently, only 10% have received such referrals, prompting lawsuits 
challenging the new process. Amanda Holpuch, Asylum: 90% of Claims Fall at First Hurdle After US 
Process Change, Lawsuit Alleges, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2019, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/nov/13/asylum-credible-fear-interview-immigration-
women-children-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/8C7A-E2LE]. After a refugee has been removed from the 
country once, a subsequent illegal entry will render her ineligible for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) 
(“If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after having been 
removed . . . the prior order of removal is reinstated . . . [and] the alien is not eligible and may not apply 
for [asylum] . . . .” (emphasis added)); Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 8478, 8485 (Feb. 19, 1999) (clarifying that aliens subject to reinstated removal orders are “ineligible 
for asylum”). 
 408 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 3 (documenting a case in which the “DOJ told [an 
asylum-seeker’s] lawyers it would increase the recommended criminal sentence if he refused to waive 
his right to seek asylum”); id. at 20 (observing that some federal prosecutors refused to strike plea deals 
with defendants who insisted upon retaining their rights to seek asylum and withholding of removal). 
 409 See id. at 19. 
 410 Keller, supra note 110, at 131–32. 
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from six months (the federal advisory guideline) to twenty years (the 
statutory maximum).411 Consequently, refugees who are prosecuted for 
illegal entry or reentry may languish in prison for a lengthy period.412 
Third, the collateral consequences of criminal convictions can be 
calamitous for refugees. Adult defendants in criminal custody are routinely 
separated from their accompanying children. Detained children, in turn, have 
suffered serious emotional and physical distress while in immigration 
detention.413 Criminal convictions also remain on refugees’ permanent 
criminal records, potentially impacting their ability to secure gainful 
employment for decades to come.414 
Thus, criminal charges can have a variety of devastating consequences 
for refugees. Some never receive a fair opportunity to petition for asylum 
and withholding of removal, while others face family separation, diminished 
employment prospects, and other collateral consequences on top of their 
prison term and fines. Cumulatively, these factors lend powerful support for 
the conclusion that prosecuting refugees for illegal entry and reentry is 
morally indefensible. 
CONCLUSION 
The opening scene of this Article describes how a magistrate judge 
sought to console several grief-stricken asylum-seekers by acknowledging 
that “none of [them] are criminals.”415 Little did he know how right he was. 
As this Article shows, refugees are not criminally liable for illegal entry or 
reentry. Since Congress adopted the Refugee Act in 1980, it has taken care 
to distinguish ordinary migrants from refugees. This distinction reflects 
 
 411 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). 
 412 One study determined that the average sentence for illegal reentry was twenty-one months. See 
Keller, supra note 110, at 132. However, sentences as long as five years are apparently not uncommon. 
See GREENE, CARSON & BLACK, supra note 123, at 45. 
 413 See Examining the Failures of the Trump Administration’s Inhumane Family Separation Policy: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 116th 
Cong. (2019) (statement of Cristina Muniz de la Pena, Terra Firma Mental Health Director, on behalf of 
the American Psychological Association), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats. 
energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/Muniz%20Testimony%20FINAL_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
E2HM-TDTT] (explaining how family separation causes psychological trauma); U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE 
TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES (June 3, 2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/ 
default/files/assets/2019-06/OIG-19-47-Jun19.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWS3-4TPT] (documenting 
inadequate care at immigration detention facilities). 
 414 See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 299–300 (2011) (identifying “a multitude of statutory and 
regulatory bars to employment at the local, state, and federal levels for convicted persons” and noting 
that “many employers . . . use the information to avoid hiring anyone with any type of record”). 
 415 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 1, at 9. 
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Congress’s recognition that the United States bears special moral and 
international legal obligations to refrain from penalizing refugees for 
irregular migration. Although §§ 1325(a) and 1326 of the INA do not 
articulate this distinction between refugees and ordinary migrants expressly, 
the broader text, context, and history of the INA reveals that Congress did 
not contemplate—and would not have approved—courts using these 
provisions to punish refugees for acts associated with their flight from 
persecution. Moreover, traditional canons of federal statutory 
interpretation—including the Charming Betsy canon, the canon on 
constitutional avoidance, and the rule of lenity—counsel that these sections 
should be interpreted to spare refugees from criminal penalties. In the final 
analysis, therefore, the observation that refugees are not “criminals” is 
accurate not only in a moral sense, but also strictly as a matter of U.S. law. 
 
